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The blood supply occupies a special place within the provincial public health systems: it is 
something that Canadians expect to be safe, well run, and available when needed. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, the Canadian blood system dealt with a significant crisis: a tainted blood scandal. The 
federal Commission of Inquiry into the Blood System in Canada issued a report condemning, 
among other things, the governance structure of Canada’s blood system. As a result, the 
provincial and federal governments worked to make changes to the way they funded, oversaw, 
and regulated the blood industry in Canada. It appears that the changes they instituted resulted in 
an improved blood system and improved the relationship between the governments and the blood 
system. Traditional models of federalism do not account for how the federal and provincial 
governments interacted. In their response to a crisis that affected thousands of Canadians, there 
were elements of collaboration, competition, and coercion. It is possible that a new “mode” of 
federalism is emerging as a result of these changes; it is more likely, however, that the crisis 
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Canada’s health care system has some serious problems. The public wants to spend less and 
receive more value for its money. More importantly, decisions for funding are politically 
driven, forcing health care providers to spend money in areas that may or may not be 
important.1 There are limitless spending opportunities while there is also a limited amount of 
money to fund them. Constitutionally, the provinces have responsibility for health care while 
the federal government tries to set the rules of the game through the Canada Health Act.  
 Much ink has been spilled discussing the conflicts inherent in a system in which one 
level of government administers health care while both levels of the system contribute in 
considerably different proportions to its funding. One area that has not received as much 
attention, however, is the non-hospital sector of health care delivery. Specifically, Canada’s 
blood system and its governance have gone virtually unexamined, particularly by political 
scientists. In some ways, it is strange that students of politics and federalism have generally 
ignored an area as politically charged as it has been in recent years. After all, the tainted blood 
scandal of the 1980s affected profoundly the way in which Canadians view the blood supply. It 
decreased the trust Canadians placed in the Red Cross Society as a provider of clean blood and 
blood products; it changed the way in which Canadians view donating blood; it changed the 
way in which the blood system is administered and governed. As news reports delved deeper 
into the causes of the tainted blood scandal, public confidence eroded and the governments re-
evaluated the role of the Canadian Red Cross Society in Canada’s blood system. 
                                                 
1 From a presentation in June 1998 by Dr. James Aubuchon entitled,  "The Role of Decision Analysis in the 
Making of Healthcare Policy" 
1 
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 After the Second World War, the Red Cross took responsibility for the administration 
of the blood system in Canada. Over the course of its work, the Society lost complete control 
of the system’s financial end and the provincial governments gradually took over its funding. 
When, in the 1980s, the system failed to screen out properly the HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis C 
viruses, Canadians’ faith in the blood supply was sorely shaken.  
 The changes in the system and the political fallout from the Red Cross make this a 
subject worthy of study. Specifically, the creation and governance of the current manufacturer 
and distributor of blood products – Canadian Blood Services (CBS) – should be of interest to 
students of federalism and public administration. Each government of Canada – provincial, 
territorial, and federal – has a stake in ensuring that the blood supply remains intact and that 
Canadians retain their faith in it. After all, the various governments failed in the 1980s and 
spent a great deal of time in the 1990s trying to prove that something similar could not occur 
again. This failure is twofold: first, the governments did not act together to govern the blood 
system under the Red Cross; and second, there was no mechanism in place to ensure effective 
management and lines of accountability to the Canadian people, who ultimately hold the 
greatest interest in a safe, cost-effective blood system. 
 The creation of Canadian Blood Services required the co-operation of each of these 
governments. The federal government regulates the blood system and oversees the safety of the 
blood supply pursuant to Good Manufacturing Practices (GMPs) established by Health 
Canada. The provincial governments act as “shareholders” in that they fund the system and 
provide broad policy direction for the corporation. In other words, the annual budget and 
everything CBS plans in a given year requires the co-operation of the provincial governments 
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through the Ministers of Health.2 In some ways, that this occurs at all is surprising given the 
difficulty many governments seem to have in agreeing on other contentious issues facing 
Canada.  
 To examine thoroughly the discussions, compromises, and disagreements that go into 
making Canadian Blood Services work, a number of things need to be considered. In 
particular, since both levels of government are involved, various theories of government 
relations in a federal system need to be examined. By reviewing pertinent literature, a 
theoretical framework can be fashioned. 
Next, Canadian Blood Services needs to be placed in historical context. To that end, 
both an historical review of the governance of the blood supply in Canada and an overview of 
the blood system under the Canadian Red Cross Society will be given. Its governance, funding 
formulae, and the causes of the tainted blood scandal will be discussed. 
 The events of the 1970s and 1980s culminated in a national tragedy of such magnitude 
as to require an independent commission to report on the events and provide recommendation 
for systemic reform. A review of these events and the ways in which the federal and provincial 
governments behaved in this time will help shed some light on the reasons for the changes in 
the blood system. 
An analysis of the Krever Inquiry and its recommendations is also necessary for 
understanding the creation of Canadian Blood Services. The Krever Report is one of the most 
important documents in the story of the Canadian blood system, as it changed forever the way 
in which the blood system operates. 
 
2 As this thesis will show, the provincial governments do not take a direct part in running the blood system, but 
their consent is required for the blood system to undertake its mission each year. 
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 The creation, funding, and governance of CBS will also be discussed as its place in 
Canada’s federal system of government is extremely important. After all, it is a national 
organization run by provincial governments, and as such, is subject to the conflicting views of 
the different provinces. Its creation was a thought-out response to specific events and 
criticisms; its funding designed to correct the mistakes of the past; its governance system 
created with a specific goal in mind: to never again allow the blood system to fail as it did in 
the 1970s and 1980s. 
 The goal of this thesis is to examine the role played by the governments of Canada in 
dealing with the Canadian blood supply. The history, circumstances, and scientific discussions 
surrounding Canada’s blood system and its problems are secondary to this examination. The 
provinces’ benign neglect of the Canadian blood system in the 1980s changed the focus of the 
different governments; their failure to ensure the safety of the blood supply was a direct cause 
of the blood tragedy. In neglecting the blood system and its operator, the provincial and 
territorial governments did not live up their role as the ultimate governors of public health in 
this country. As a result, they had to examine their roles and responsibilities in the blood 
supply. In doing so, they also had to examine the intergovernmental relationships that helped 
cause the tragedy and refocus their efforts on active prevention of problems. They created a 
blood system from the bottom up in order to ensure that there are mechanisms in place to 
monitor blood system in a proactive fashion rather than the ad hoc and reactive basis on which 
it was administered in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 Until the Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada, governments did not 
pay much attention to the Red Cross’s Blood Transfusion Service. In fact, the provinces 
neglected the system so much that they bear partial responsibility for the scandal and its 
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aftermath. After a decade of constitutional federalism and collaborative federalism, provincial 
governments were forced into action and took control of the blood system in an effort to react 
to the recommendations made by the Commission and to plan for the future of Canada’s blood 
supply. The federal and provincial governments acted as “crisis managers” when dealing with 
the blood system. Canadians reacted so strongly to the failure of a system they thought was 
safe that the governments were all forced into action. The emergence of a new form of 
federalism– “coercive federalism” – from this series of events in blood system reform could 
even be a new way of looking at federal-provincial relations. It is more likely, however, that it 
was the crisis that precipitated the change in government behaviour, not a change in the way 
governments view one another. 
               Health care in Canada is a responsibility shared by the national and provincial 
governments. Health issues are so important to the Canadian people that it is incumbent upon 
federal and provincial governments - at both the political and bureaucratic levels – to work 
well with each other. Governments could interact with each other in many different ways.  
                The argument of this thesis is that examination of the development of blood system 
governance in Canada suggests that federal-provincial relations in the modern period contain 
three elements: collaboration, competition, and coercion. To date, disagreements have on 
occasion become acrimonious, but governments have avoided warfare. In so doing they can 
best be viewed as "interdependent competitors."3
 
3 Alan C. Cairns, “The Governments and Societies of Canadian Federalism,” Canadian Journal of Political 




The Canadian system of government is a federal one; that is, there are two distinct levels of 
government representing the national and provincial arenas. In the Canadian case, the federal 
and provincial governments are assigned specific responsibilities in the Constitution Act, 1982 
(originally, the British North America Act, 1867). One consequence of federalism is that the 
two levels of government share the same set of voters (that is to say, the same citizens who 
elect a federal government also elect a provincial one.) This is even more important in a 
province like Ontario, which has the same ridings as the federal government. This, in turn 
means that “[c]itizens are expected to be members of and loyal to, both the national 
community, embodied in the national government, and the provincial communities reflected in 
their provincial governments.”4 A second consequence of the federal system of government is 
that the federal and provincial governments must communicate and work in a number of 
different ways: separately; one dominating the other; as competitors; or as collaborators. The 
provincial and federal governments have worked in each of these ways over the course of 
Canada’s history. 
It is important to examine these themes of federalism to understand more fully how 
Canadian federalism works and how the provinces failed in the 1980s. We will examine each 
of the phases of Canadian federalism to have a better understanding of their impacts on the 
governance of Canada’s blood supply. This theoretical framework will provide a background 
into federalism, which will help to explain some of the actions of the provincial governments 
                                                 
4 Ian Robinson and Richard Simeon, “The Dynamics of Canadian Federalism” in James Bickerton and Alain-G. 
Gagnon (eds.), Canadian Politics, 3rd ed. (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1999), p. 240. 
6 
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in running the Red Cross’s Blood Transfusion Services and in creating Canadian Blood 
Services.   
 “Made in Canada” – A country is born 
In 1867, the creation of the Dominion of Canada brought disparate colonies together under one 
national government. The system of government chosen was the result of negotiation between 
the colonies. In choosing a federal system over other options, the Fathers of Confederation 
chose one flexible enough to undergo a series of changes, which is precisely what has 
happened over the course of Canadian history. 
 In constructing a political system, the Fathers of Confederation had to contend with a 
number of issues. They had to unite very different colonies with very different needs; they had 
to set up a political system that would work across what was then a very large land mass; they 
had to deal with the political realities of each of the colonies. In short, the Fathers of 
Confederation had quite a challenge when they set out to build a country. 
 There were three different approaches to setting up the Canadian government. The first 
option was a unitary system, wherein all governmental powers were reserved for one level of 
government, as in the United Kingdom (until recently) or France. The second option was to 
create a federal system and give powers to two levels of government: national and local. The 
third option was a confederal system, wherein the parts of the system are supreme; the 
constituent parts give legitimacy and power to the central government. 
 The Québec and Maritime delegates to the Confederation conferences were worried 
that a federal system of government would make the provinces “merely large municipal 
corporations.”5 In some ways, this assessment turned out to be accurate, as the provincial 
 
5 Discussion by the Fathers of Confederation in Sir Joseph Pope (ed.), Confederation Documents Hitherto 
Unpublished, (Toronto: The Carswell Co., 1895), p. 84. 
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legislatures became responsible for “local issues.”6 However, as the welfare state expanded in 
the 1930s and 1940s, provincial powers grew in importance and provinces became more 
powerful within the federation. 
 Even the compromises reached at the Confederation conferences did not change the 
relative power of the federal over the provincial governments. Although both orders of 
government had defined spheres of responsibility and each was sovereign within those spheres, 
the federal government was still more powerful. Unlike the federal-provincial co-operation 
required today given the overlap in spheres of responsibility, the British North America Act 
(1867) allowed for the possibility of eventual control of the provinces by the federal 
government.7
 The federal system created by Confederation placated the provincial desire for 
autonomy expressed by Nova Scotia delegate Edward Chandler, who argued that provinces had 
to have a certain amount of power or else they would have “less powers than they have allowed 
them from England”.8 More importantly, however, the federal government could find a number 
of different ways to interfere in provincial areas of jurisdiction. Three of the most important 
were the power of the Crown through the Governor General to appoint the Lieutenant 
Governors; the powers of reservation and disallowance; and the general powers accorded the 
federal government “to make laws for the Peace, Order, and good government of Canada.”9 
These powers were important in their own way, but are not important to the argument in this 
 
6 F.R. Scott, “Centralization and Decentralization in Canadian Federalism,” in Garth Stevenson, ed. Federalism in 
Canada: Selected Readings, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1989), p. 53, 58. 
7 Gordon Robertson, “The role of Interministerial Conferences in the Decision-Making Process” in Richard 
Simeon, ed. Confrontation and Collaboration – Intergovernmental Relations in Canada Today. (Mississauga: 
Imperial Press, Ltd., 1979), p. 78. 
8 Pope, p. 84. 
9 British North America Act (1867) 
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thesis except that they were indicative of the primary role of the national government 
compared to the provinces. 
 Another indication was the absence in the 1867 document of any reference to the matter 
of constitutional amendment, except for the wording in the preamble that the colonies wished 
to be “federally united … with a Constitution similar in principle to that of the United 
Kingdom.” Despite the reference to federalism within a British parliamentary system, the lack 
of specific discussion made the implication clear: constitutional change did not necessarily 
involve the provinces. Soon after Confederation, however, the question of how to interpret the 
BNA Act became a matter of controversy. 
Compact or Confederation?10
There are two schools of thought surrounding interpretation of the BNA Act: is it a compact 
between the English and French to create a single country, or a true federation of provinces 
united under one Canadian banner through Confederation? The interpretation of the intentions 
of the BNA Act is important because it has serious implications for the way Canadian 
governments operate. After all, if Canada is a compact, then intergovernmental co-operation is 
essential to making the country work; under this theory, the country only exists because the 
provinces make it work.11 On the other hand, if the federal government holds power of its own 
accord, then it can dictate to the provinces using its powers as enumerated in the British North 
America Act.  
 
10 “Confederation” is used in this sense as the union of the provinces to form the Dominion of Canada. The 
Dominion is not a confederal system, so the term “Confederation” is somewhat of a misnomer. However, it is also 
the identifier of a specific event in time and is therefore used in this thesis. 
11 However, intergovernmental co-operation is only “essential” according to the provinces that decide it is. Others 
could argue that “essential” is a value judgment and not an objective statement of fact under the compact theory. 
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 By the time the Confederation conferences resulted in agreement, it was clear that, 
despite Macdonald’s desire for a legislative union, a federal system was the only one that could 
be workable. After all, in addition to the Canadian experience of differing cultures, laws, and 
religion, the Maritime Provinces had equally distinct issues that one Canadian Parliament could 
not necessarily resolve. Federalism appeared to be the only available option. 
 Sir John A. Macdonald believed that the federal government would eventually reign 
supreme over the provincial governments. The mechanisms for doing so were certainly in 
place within the BNA Act; as far as he was concerned, the federal government should take no 
note of the local levels of government and that he would triumph in the end.12 In fact, it is clear 
that Macdonald’s intent was to control the provinces through the federal government’s rights 
and privileges.13
 As it might be expected, provincial governments were unwilling to give up what they 
perceived to be their sovereignty. In fact, through decisions of the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council, provincial governments gained a great deal of power; Macdonald was not able 
to take control as he wished. Provinces, in turn, used their newfound power to great advantage 
within the federal system.14 Not only did provinces get control over areas of their jurisdiction, 
but they also asserted themselves more on the national scene. This, in turn, forced governments 
to either work together on policy issues or compete with one another for the approval of the 
electorate. 
 
12 Stanley, p. 98. 
13 Richard Simeon, ed. Confrontation and Collaboration – Intergovernmental Relations in Canada today, 
(Mississauga: Imperial Press, Ltd., 1979), p. 78. 
14 Alan C. Cairns, “The Governments and Societies of Canadian Federalism,” Canadian Journal of Political 
Science. 10:4 (1977): 695-725. 
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 Why is this important for the discussions in this paper? The federal-provincial 
relationship is of importance to students of federalism if for no other reason than government 
interaction and negotiation influences the ways in which policies are made. The evolution of 
federalism in Canadian history helps to define the ways in which policies were and are made. 
 Macdonald’s vision of folding provincial responsibilities into the federal Parliament 
was never realized; the issue was whether the division of powers in the BNA Act would result 
in the separation of the two levels of government (except in areas of concurrent jurisdiction) or 
would the various Canadian governments interact with each other, either as competitors or 
collaborators. 
In the evolution of the Canadian federation since 1867, there have been a number of 
changes, sufficiently different in magnitude that one can speak of “stages.” Each stage meant a 
shift in the ways the governments talked to one another about issues concerning both levels. 
Usually, these matters centred on money and provincial autonomy. As Canada aged and areas 
of federal/provincial co-operation expanded, differing methods of communication, negotiation, 
or (non-) co-operation became features of the system 
 Federalism obviously involves governments. It also involves citizens. As political 
scientist Ian Richardson says, “Federalism is thus about the coexistence of multiple loyalties 
and identities and about shared, or divided, authority.”15 The requirement of support for both 
levels of government frustrates the attempts of one level to work unilaterally towards a goal. It 
further forces governments to try to work together for the common good of the individual 
provinces and the nation as a whole. In the following section, there will be an examination of 
 
15 Robinson and Simeon, p. 241. 
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how the federation has evolved, focusing on how governments interact with each other in the 
contemporary system.  
Colonial Federalism 
The first thirty years of Canadian history are about a country trying to figure itself out. After 
all, the colonies that formed the dominion had originally been provinces dealing with local 
issues. The new federal government needed to assert itself and undertake a period of nation-
building to consolidate its power.16 Ottawa did just that through Macdonald’s National 
Policy17, and through relentless use of all the powers provided by the British North America 
Act. In spite of provincial arguments that Canada was a compact among the provinces, Sir John 
A. Macdonald treated the provinces as colonies, and tried to keep them in the position of 
submission implied by that term.18
 The “colonial federalism” of this period was highlighted by two factors. First, the 
Governor General and Lieutenant Governors played a much more active role within the federal 
and provincial governments. The Governor General, as representative of the British 
government, acted as such within the framework of Parliament. More importantly, the 
Lieutenant Governors acted on Ottawa’s behalf to ensure that the provinces remained as 
colonies. Politicians at both levels of government treated their respective governors as 
monarchs with a real role to play in the system of government, something unthinkable today.19
 The second item ensuring a colonial feel in Canada was the treatment of the provincial 
governments by the federal government. By using its constitutionally guaranteed powers of 
 
16 Robinson and Simeon, p. 247. 
17 http://www.collectionscanada.ca/2/18/h18-2360-e.html  
18 J.R. Mallory, “The Five Faces of Federalism,” in J. Peter Meekison, ed., Canadian Federalism: Myth or 
Reality, third ed. (Toronto: Methuen, 1977), p. 20. At the same time, the provinces fought for – and won – many 
concessions from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which led to an increase in provincial power. 
Macdonald’s strategy was not as successful as he hoped it would be. 
19 Mallory, p. 20. 
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disallowance and reservation, the federal government retained – technical – control over 
provincial legislation.20 This treatment of the provinces as colonies only increased the desire of 
the provincial governments to stop Macdonald’s use of federal powers and to gain real control 
over their constitutional areas of jurisdiction. As a result, the first federal-provincial conflicts 
began. 
 This conflict became more profound after 1890, when the chief nation-building 
exercises concluded. Linguistic and cultural minorities began to assert themselves; specifically, 
French Canadians in Québec started to argue that the provincial community – and not the 
federal – was best suited to defend their specific rights.21 With this example to follow, the other 
provincial governments began to strengthen their powers vis à vis the federal government. The 
provinces emphasized that they had exclusive jurisdiction over the powers in section 92, and 
that the federal government should not use its constitutional powers to stop them. As the level 
of government empowered to deal with local issues, the provinces argued, they should be left 
alone to govern as they saw fit.22 Indeed, Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier argued that “it would 
be difficult to find a prominent politician who was not willing to pay at least lip service to the 
principle of provincial rights and its theoretical underpinning, the compact theory.”23 This 
notion of provincial rights is important to consider when dealing with colonial and classical 
federalism. After all, the assertion of provincial rights meant two things: “first, the provincial 
governments were converted from glorified municipalities into coordinate sovereignties in 
 
20 Mallory, p. 20. 
21 Robinson and Simeon, p. 247. 
22 Robinson and Simeon, p. 248. The 1896 Local Prohibition reference brought this issue to the fore. A man 
convicted under the Canada Temperance Act argued that he acted legally because he had a license from the 
province. Ontario and the federal government took the case to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which 
ruled that this was a matter of overlapping jurisdictions; both the provinces and the federal government could have 
enacted legislation. 
23 Filipo Sabetti and Harold M. Waller, “Introduction,” in Harold Waller, Filipo Sabetti, Daniel J. Elazar, eds. 
Canadian Federalism: From Crisis to Constitution. (London: University Press of America, Inc., 1983), p. 4. 
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matters of public policy. Second, the provinces acquired the right to be consulted about, and to 
share in the choice of, the formula for amending the BNA.”24
Classical Federalism 
The change from colonial to classical federalism did not occur suddenly. Nonetheless, the 
period from 1896 – the year of the Local Prohibition Case and the election of the Liberals led 
by Laurier, with a pro-province stance on language rights and the provinces – until the early 
1930s can be categorized as “classical federalism.” Each level of government kept largely to 
itself during this period, and the federal government used its powers less and less. Areas of 
concurrent jurisdiction had little conflict since interference by the state was still unacceptable.25 
In 1930, however, the Great Depression changed the role of government in Canada.  
 The collapse of the Canadian economy meant that federalism needed to be revised. 
Provincial governments, responsible for the social welfare of their constituents, “were driven to 
the brink of bankruptcy.”26 Nor could the federal government do much to help because the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) ruled against it, stating that Ottawa could not 
use its powers in areas of sole provincial responsibility.27  
 Classical federalism, then, meant that each level of government had its own watertight 
compartments that could not be penetrated by the other level. This view of federalism came 
under attack during the 1930s, as the federal government tried to help the provincial 
governments respond to the Depression of the 1930s, and the debate was opened even further 
during the Second World War. The emergency powers of the War Measures Act gave Ottawa 
 
24 Sabetti and Waller, p. 5. 
25 Robinson and Simeon, p. 248. 
26 Robinson and Simeon, p. 248. 
27 Mallory, p. 22. 
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sweeping powers to interfere with areas of provincial jurisdiction.28 As Canadians saw the 
effects of a quasi-unitary state, the governments began to discuss the re-alignment of 
constitutional responsibilities. Some thought that, with the change from a family-based 
economy to that of an industrialized one, a central government was better suited to deal with 
national problems like the Depression.29 However, the provinces continued to object to this 
notion of centralizing government, forcing the federal government to re-think its approach. 
Co-operative Federalism 
This new approach was a period lasting approximately from 1945 until 1960. It was a period 
characterized by compromise and, as the name implies, co-operation. It was argued the federal 
government needed to play a greater role in administering the social programs run by the 
provinces; however, the provincial governments were reluctant to give up any of their powers. 
Ottawa continued its efforts to centralize political power at the federal level. In doing so, the 
federal government took over some areas of provincial jurisdiction by negotiating federal 
control over the provincial tax systems and through extensive use of the federal spending 
power. Classical federalism broke down as the two levels of government stopped thinking 
about their jurisdictions as “watertight compartments” and combined their efforts, although 
Québec had strong objections to the federal government participating (the province would have 
said “interfering”) in provincial programs. Québec, in particular, fought for the continuation of 
watertight compartments throughout this period, but the federal government controlled the 
period with its continued dominance over the provinces in terms of social programs. 
 
28 Mallory, p. 23. 
29 Robinson and Simeon, p. 249. The Rowell-Sirois Commission, appointed by the federal government to examine 
the nature of Dominion-provincial relations, did not recommend centralization as a solution to the problems. 
Instead, it recommended that the provinces retain significant control over how services are delivered within their 
areas of constitutional jurisdiction. The Commission did recommend, however, that the federal government ensure 
that services delivered by the provinces could be offered across the country at similar quality from one province to 
the next. 
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It was widely assumed that the federal government, using its fiscal and monetary 
policies along with its spending power, would be able to generate, direct and co-ordinate public 
policies better than the provinces could on their own.30 There was an argument that the 
Canadian constitution was written before the welfare state became a necessity and that the 
federal government was in a better position to offer many of the social services for which the 
provinces had responsibility;31 co-operation was therefore necessary.  
 The process of blurring the jurisdictional lines between federal and provincial 
responsibility was generally quite harmonious (Québec was the exception, both in this period 
and throughout the history of Canada’s blood system). The provinces accepted the system 
because they knew they could keep control of the specific programs while the federal 
government wanted national standards; trust existed between the participants because they 
tended to be from the same functional area and had an already-existing level of comfort with 
their counterparts; federalism was treated as an administrative, not a political issue.32
 Co-operative federalism, then, was a period of federal/provincial relations marked by 
very little conflict and a seemingly honest desire to do what was best for the country as a 
whole, rather than for a particular jurisdictional fiefdom. There were, of course, difficulties in 
this period. Ottawa had some difficulty convincing the provinces that its way was best 
regarding, for example, tax collection. Moreover, co-operative federalism was an Ottawa-
centric period; the provinces – except for Québec – had very little to say and were often merely 
secondary players.  
 
30 Donald V. Smiley, “Federal-Provincial Conflict in Canada,” Publius. 4:3 (Summer, 1974), p. 8. 
31 Mallory, p. 25. 
32 Robinson and Simeon, p. 251. 
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Competitive Federalism 
It is somewhat surprising that competitive federalism is not the only period of federalism in 
Canada. Even without federalism in place, Canada’s political system is based on competition 
between parties. Responsible government and the party system require that governments be 
held to account and another party act as a “government-in-waiting.” Federalism adds another 
dimension to governmental competition by asking all governments to “search for popular 
support”33 while they try to govern.  
 In 1960, the Quiet Revolution began in Québec as a logical extension of the province-
building that went on in the years after Confederation.34 The social and political changes 
created by the Jean Lesage government extended to federal-provincial relations as well as the 
internal politics of the province. Lesage’s policy agenda had one simple theme: maîtres chez 
nous. Québec, as a province, would arrange its own affairs without the assistance of the federal 
government. At first, this policy dealt solely with federal-provincial fiscal policies. The rise of 
the Parti Québécois, however, meant that constitutional arrangements were also part of the 
discussion. By 1970, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and his view of a united Canada interfered 
with the Québec notion of a decentralized Canada. The two opposing views of a centralized 
versus decentralized nation spilled over onto the national arena with the other provinces 
challenging the Trudeau vision of Canada.35  
 The discontent of other provinces with the centralizing nature of the government in 
Ottawa came because of the “growing resources, competence, and confidence of provincial 
governments and their bureaucracies, which, fuelled by federal transfers, had been growing 
 
33 Albert Breton, “The Theory of Competitive Federalism” in Stevenson, p. 463. 
34 Edwin R. Black and Alan C. Cairns, “A Different Perspective on Canadian Federalism,” Canadian Public 
Administration, XI:1 (March, 1966), p. 29. 
35 Robinson and Simeon, p. 253. 
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much faster than the federal government.”36 Provinces began to see themselves as independent 
states, capable of performing the tasks assigned to them by the electorate. In spite of desires on 
the part of Ottawa to create national programs, provincial governments were unwilling to give 
up any measure of their sovereignty.  
 Instead, the provincial premiers spent time building their own fiefdoms. The regions of 
Canada became more powerful by pushing their concerns on the national stage and competing 
with the federal government on national issues. Another reason for the surge in province 
building was the electoral success realized by the provincial premiers when Ottawa was 
accused of interfering with provincial jurisdictions.37
 A process that started with the Quiet Revolution rapidly became an exercise in reform 
of intergovernmental relations. While old rivalries rose up between the regions and the central 
government, two competing visions of Canada arose. The federal government saw itself as the 
superior level of government, one in charge of keeping Canada whole. Conversely, the 
provinces saw all eleven governments as equal partners in the federation.38 The Canadian 
federalist state had changed. The two levels of government no longer had distinct areas of 
responsibility; instead, they were engaged in what Robinson and Simeon call “competitive 
state-building.” Simply put, this is the notion that both levels of government seek to expand 
their powers and become de facto unitary states.39 This is not to suggest that the governments 
were engaged in open warfare; rather, they were each attempting to carve out a specific and 
defined role for themselves.  
 
36 Robinson and Simeon, p. 253. 
37 Mark Sproule-Jones, Governments at work: Canadian Parliamentary federalism and its Public Policy Effects. 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), p. 90. 
38 Robinson and Simeon, p. 253. It should be noted that this view is notwithstanding the Québec argument of “two 
founding nations.” 
39 Robinson and Simeon, p. 253. This argument follows from the Black and Cairns article cited earlier. 
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 Moreover, the competitive state building in which all governments were engaged 
changed the nature of intergovernmental relations. Instead of the negotiations over 
administrative details characteristic of co-operative federalism, intergovernmental meetings 
erupted into fundamental policy debates. Each level of government wanted to position itself as 
the defender of constituent interests rather than seek specific, real compromise.40
Constitutional Federalism 
The state-building process that the governments underwent in the 1970s impacted directly on 
their constitutional responsibilities. It was inevitable, then, that the constitutional debates of the 
previous half-century returned. Ironically, the successful constitutional deal brokered by Pierre 
Trudeau does not fall under the umbrella of constitutional federalism, but under competitive 
federalism. After all, he designed his constitutional proposal to strengthen the powers of the 
federal government at the expense of the provincial governments, although he had to make a 
number of concessions to the provinces in order to do so.41 Instead, the Mulroney government 
(1984-1993) occurred within the period of constitutional federalism.  
 This period was one of turmoil because of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s obsession 
with constitutional reform. Federal/provincial relations were centred around the desire to bring 
Québec into the constitutional fold and the specific interests of individual provinces. 
Federalism also changed: instead of just being discussions between governments, the system 
expanded to include discussions between citizens and their governments.42 However, the 
period dealt only with constitutional reform, not with the nature of intergovernmental relations 
outside a re-writing of the constitution. 
 
40 Robinson and Simeon, p. 254. 
41 Adam D. McDonald, “Constitution-Making as Intergovernmental Relations: A Case Study of the 1980 
Canadian Constitutional Negotiations,” Federal Governance 1:1 (October 2002), p. 12. 
42 Robinson and Simeon, p. 255. 
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Collaborative Federalism 
Collaborative federalism is distinct from co-operative federalism in that the two levels of 
government have carved out specific fiefdoms for themselves. Instead of the situation of the 
1960s, where the governments had very little debate before agreeing to co-operate, a joint 
venture must show itself to be politically viable for all concerned. After all, with the 
downloading of responsibilities started n the late 1950s under Diefenbaker (and continued to 
the recession of the early 1990s), governments had to re-think their economic priorities; as a 
result, the federal government lost the ability to dictate to the provinces through the use of its 
spending power.43 A national outlook on any given policy, then, was impossible without real 
negotiation and discussion. Provinces became more powerful in relation to Ottawa because 
they had the programs and the money. Provinces needed to collaborate on national programs 
such as health care; although they controlled the money spent on the programs, Ottawa could 
claim that the provinces needed a “national” approach, which then required inter-provincial 
collaboration. Instead of the federal system under which governments had worked, a more 
collaborative structure was taking shape.44 The social agreements of the mid-1990s were part 
of this renewed collaborative spirit. The federal government acted as a facilitator to get the 
provinces to form a national set of social policies. In particular, the spending power was no 
longer to be used in a carrot-and-stick approach to governance.  
 Collaborative federalism, then, is a more respectful way of ensuring that 
intergovernmental relations work. It is not based on one level of government dictating to 
another. It is not based on the argumentation, rhetoric, and fights characteristic of competitive 
federalism. It is, however, appropriate, given the political tone of the 1990s. It provides all 
 
43 Robinson and Simeon, p. 257. 
44 Robinson and Simeon, p. 258. 
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governments with the ability to say that their goals have been met at the end of federal-
provincial summits, although there is an element of competition involved in collaborative 
federalism. Each level of government has an incentive to be seen as providing a given set of 
benefits to the public while at the same time avoiding the costs involved in providing that set of 
benefits.45 The collaborative spirit of federal-provincial relations may just be an attempt by 
both levels of government to avoid being seen as an antagonist at home and to be able to 
proclaim victory after first ministers’ conferences. 
 It is at this stage Canadian politics sits at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
Having evolved through the various stages of federalism, the federal and provincial 
governments have reached a stage of détente, or an uneasy peace. Attempts by one government 
or another to carve out more political territory for itself would likely mean that a new phase in 
federalism has begun. A discussion of what makes the federal-provincial dynamic work – or 
not work – is necessary to complete the theoretical framework. 
 Competitive federalism can most simply be defined in this way: “governments are 
rivals among themselves and with private institutions in seeking to supply policies to meet the 
preferences of citizens.”46 As has been stated several times throughout this chapter, federal and 
provincial governments compete for the support of the same voter base. Since governments are 
political creatures, they want credit for good initiatives and want to divert attention from bad 
ones. Competition, therefore, is not always the best option for governments. Instead, they must 
sometimes collaborate on initiatives. Competition is enhanced by the co-operation of 
 
45 Sproule-Jones, p. 97. 
46 Sproule-Jones, p. 97. 
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governments. Without it, the efforts of each level of government “will increasingly frustrate the 
policies of each other by inadvertence or even in some cases by deliberate design.”47  
 The issue of competition with the federal government also affects provinces. The 
Constitution gives significant levels of power to the federal government. Not only are its 
responsibilities defined, but the fact that the federal government has concurrent jurisdiction 
with some provincial responsibilities means that Ottawa has significant clout when it comes to 
federal-provincial disputes.48 Health care is one of these areas. As Donald V. Smiley notes, 
“nationalist and egalitarian sentiments propel the federal government into action directed 
toward establishing minimum Canada-wide standards in respect to such public services as are 
from time to time defined to be vital to the welfare of all citizens.”49 There is significant 
incentive, then, for the provincial governments to do one of three things: 
1. Co-operate individually with the federal government to ensure that the province in 
question gets credit for any given initiative. 
 
2. Co-operate with one another to gain public opinion and force the federal 
government to follow the provincial lead. 
 
3. Provide resistance to “bad” ideas to show the voters that the federal government is 
forcing the provincial governments into a bad situation. 
 
 The federal and provincial governments have their own reasons for choosing whether to 
co-operate. They have specific goals when it comes to intergovernmental relations. Provincial 
governments will always press provincial interests and the federal government federal 
interests. Moreover, provinces want to “safeguard and if possible extend the range of 
 
47 Donald V. Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalism in the eighties, third edition. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill 
Ryerson Limited, 1980), p. 92. 
48 Although this may be true in a constitutional sense, it could be argued that Ottawa has almost no political clout 
in these disputes. After all, anything but unanimity in a federal-provincial conference is seen as failure, while 
provincial premiers are often rewarded for opposing Ottawa’s demands. 
49 Smiley, p. 92. 
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jurisdictional autonomy, including of course the revenues that provinces have under their 
unshared control.”50
 It is also important to note that party affiliation does not appear to matter when it comes 
to federal-provincial relations. The federal government has no stake in ensuring that its 
provincial cousins are in power, as they will push for provincial interests. When it comes to 
specific policies, governments of a similar stripe are not necessarily more open to negotiation 
than parties of opposing ideological views.51  
 Carl Hodge expands on this point when he points out that, unlike the presidential-
congressional system in the United States, Canada’s Parliament has very specific party 
discipline. Members of Parliament (MPs) cannot vote based on regional affiliation, such as the 
American “cotton bloc” or “corn belt.” Moreover, the Canadian Senate is not a voice for the 
provinces or regions, as the American Senate is. Instead, the provincial governments, in 
intergovernmental negotiation, are responsible for promoting provincial or even regional 
interests. Even though federal party leaders are obligated to recognize significant regional 
support, said recognition does not have to translate into legislative action. Party discipline 
ensures that a party leader will carry the day. The leader cannot, however, affect the positions 
of the regional – or provincial – governments.52 Thus, provinces can portray themselves as the 
only valid voice of regional interests. Similarly, the federal government can say it is the 
defender of national interests. 
 Finally, it is important to note that, while provinces complain about federal 
encroachment on their jurisdictions, a return to the watertight compartment theory is 
 
50 Smiley, p. 113. 
51 Smiley, p. 148. 
52 Carl Cavanagh Hodge, Canadian Regionalism or Canadian Federalism? (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 
1984), p. 26-27. 
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unworkable. There is too much overlap in responsibility, and – more importantly – one cannot 
always place public affairs issues in easily identifiable pigeonholes. This can benefit Canadian 
society; after all, “shared responsibility opens up the possibility that the federal and provincial 
governments might compete to respond to citizens’ problems. In this competition, the need to 
win popular support can temper the self-interest of governments.”53
 One example of the competition and collaboration themes in action can be found in the 
history of Canada’s blood supply. Throughout the history of the publicly-funded blood system, 
each level of government has been involved. At first, they simply encouraged the Red Cross; as 
time went on, governments became involved in funding and, eventually, governing the blood 
system. The competitive and collaborative spirits embraced by the provincial governments 
both destroyed and rebuilt the system. Its successes and failures reflect on the ability of the 
provinces to define and work toward a national system run by provincial interests.  
 
53 Murray Forsyth, ed. Federalism and Nationalism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), p. 162. 
 
Chapter 3  
Blood Transfusion Medicine 
Blood tragedies are not new. As human beings studied blood, they experimented and made 
mistakes as they made progress. The mistakes made throughout the history of blood 
transfusion medicine seemed to amplify as time went on. Intuitively, this makes a lot of sense. 
Early on, blood transfusions were rare; while the risks were great to the individual(s) being 
transfused, there appeared to be no great risk to society as a whole. As blood transfusions 
became more common, so too did accidents. Greater numbers of transfusions also meant more 
accidents and the associated risks increased. 
 Even the type of blood accident changed with time. In the first blood transfusions, 
patients often died because doctors did not understand the basic principles of transfusion. Once 
scientists understood the process of transfusion, the problem became one of collection, 
transportation, production, and delivery. With these problems mastered, blood-borne diseases 
became the problem. The spread of HIV, AIDS, Hepatitis, and other blood-borne pathogens 
resulted in an enormous study and overhaul of the Canadian blood system and is the indirect 
focus of this paper.54
 Canada was not the only country affected by a blood tragedy. In fact, just about every 
industrialized nation had a highly-publicized tragedy related to its blood system: 
In America, patients have filed hundreds of civil suits against doctors, drug 
companies, and even their own patient organizations … In England, AIDS-
infected hemophilia patients castigated their national transfusion service … In 
Japan, patients charged that the government and drug companies criminally 
concealed the contamination of blood products…55
 
                                                 
54 For further reading, please see The Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Canada’s Blood System or the 1993 
report from the House of Commons Standing Committee on Health and Welfare, Social Affairs, Seniors, and 
Women. 
55 Douglas Starr, Blood: An Epic History of Medicine and Commerce. New York: Knopf, 1998, p. x. 
25 
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 Canada’s Krever Inquiry (discussed at length in Chapter 5) discussed the blood systems 
of other countries and the ways in which they dealt with the HIV/AIDS tragedies. Although 
each of the systems failed the victims, each system is different: the Red Cross ran the blood 
system in many European countries; the United Kingdom ran its own blood system through a 
state monopoly; the United States allowed a combination of both not-for-profit and commercial 
organizations to collect, manufacture, and distribute blood.56
 The point is that while the federal nature of the Canadian system allowed some specific 
problems to occur, both in the competitive nature of politics and the negligence of the 
provinces, Canada was not alone in its systemic problems. 
 These events, while tragic, brought to light some important facts in these countries. 
First, they showed that the blood supplies of these countries required better protection. Second, 
the public reaction to the blood scandals revealed a significant lack of education as to blood 
and its products.57 Finally, the problems in the blood supplies of these countries showed that 
the blood service providers had significant problems to overcome. 
 Blood transfusion medicine underwent a different evolution depending on the specific 
country involved. In the Canadian case, the experiences in both Europe and the United States 
influenced the systemic changes. Before embarking on a discussion of the Canadian blood 
experience, it is important to understand how its governance came about. 
 
56 Horace Krever, Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada: Final  Report. (Ottawa: Minister of 
Supply and Services Canada, 1997), p. 721. 
57 Starr, p. x. 
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A New Science: Blood Transfusion Medicine 
Although Wilfrid Laurier said that the twentieth century would belong to Canada, it is certain 
that the United States was the nation most likely to take the new century by storm. Technology, 
science, industry, and economics were all booming with all the excitement the new century 
could bring. Blood transfusion medicine was no exception. With the decline in popularity of 
bloodletting in the previous century, scientists continued to examine ways to use human blood 
for practical purposes. 
 One such way was through was through human blood transfusion. In the early decades 
of the twentieth century, blood donations were difficult for both patient and donor, and so it 
was difficult to find donors willing to provide blood.58 Obviously, donors and patients did not 
enjoy the procedure as it existed, and the doctors wanted to find ways to improve it.  
 Doctors at research hospitals across North America worked to improve the science of 
blood transfusion through the early years of the twentieth century. Their efforts were, for the 
most part, successful, and they managed to find ways to keep blood “fresh” outside the human 
body long enough to do some good. 
 While scientists were involved and interested in discovery, the fact remains that the 
adage “necessity is the mother of invention” has roots in basic truth. When it came to 
transfusion science, necessity truly was the mother of invention. War made it necessary to step 
up research and experimentation in blood transfusions, just to keep soldiers alive. War became 
a major reason to study blood and change the way civilians viewed its collection, storage, and 
distribution. 
 
58 Starr, p. 43. Donations were direct, donor-to-patient affairs, meaning that doctors cut open both the donor and 
patient, stuck a tube inside each of them, and watched as the blood passed from one to the other. 
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A Call to Arms: Blood Services expand across the Globe  
Blood transfusion medicine had come a long way from the days of bloodletting and crude 
experimentation. Nonetheless, there was not yet a system whereby blood could be collected 
and distributed in an efficient manner. Blood donations were collected on an ad hoc basis so 
when blood was needed, the doctor still had to find a compatible donor and use the blood 
almost immediately.59 There was no system in place to collect and store the blood until needed. 
 The issue of blood storage became more important during and just after the First World 
War. Dr. Geoffrey Keynes, a British surgeon based in London, saw the techniques used by 
American doctors to transfuse patients injured on the field of battle. Although the actual 
number of transfusions was relatively small, they made an impression upon Keynes. He 
returned to London determined to increase awareness of blood transfusion medicine among 
British doctors.60 Keynes wrote and spoke extensively on the need for blood transfusions and 
started to amass a pool of donors. 
 At the same time, a member of the British Red Cross was beginning to organize blood 
donors elsewhere in London. Percy Oliver had been part of a dramatic incident in 1921. When 
doctors needed blood for a surgery, a call went out to the city – as was the custom – asking for 
donors to provide help for the patient. Oliver and three other men from the Red Cross went to 
the hospital to help. One was a match for the patient, and so a life was saved.61 More 
importantly, however, an idea began to germinate in Oliver’s mind. Doctors who wanted to 
transfuse blood had to contend with an unreliable supply, and there was always a risk that 
donors would not be available at the exact moment blood was needed. 
 
59 Starr, p. 53. 
60 Geoffrey Keynes, The Gates of Memory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 144. 
61 British Red Cross Society, Report of the Blood Transfusion Service for the Year Ended Dec. 31st, 1926 
(London: Petley & Co. Printers, n.d.), p. 5-9. 
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 Transfusion science had evolved to the point where blood could be stored for a short 
time until it was needed. All that was required was a steady supply to meet the demand.62 
Oliver believed that he could recruit people who would make themselves available when blood 
was required. He set out to recruit, pre-screen, and pre-type a list of people who would be 
called. In 1922, Oliver and twenty professional acquaintances were called thirteen times. By 
1926, he had been called almost 800 times, so he set out to expand operations.63 The Greater 
London Red Cross Blood Transfusion Service was established as the first organized donor 
panel.  
 In its early days, Oliver’s organization was loose and completely run by volunteers: 
Percy Oliver and his wife. Together, they kept a list of people willing to be called on at all 
hours of the day; they collected donations, paid donor expenses, wrote reports, interviewed 
visitors, canvassed for donors, and gave lectures on the need to donate blood.64
 Oliver’s donation scheme and Keynes’s desire to increase the popularity of transfusion 
in the medical profession came together under the Blood Transfusion Service when Oliver 
asked Keynes to serve as a medical advisor. The two of them helped increase the size of the 
donor panel to serve more than 160 hospitals in Greater London by the 1930s; their efforts 
even inspired other countries throughout the world, including Germany, Russia, Japan, France, 
and the United States.65
 In the 1920s, a new organization called the Blood Transfusion Betterment Association 
was formed in New York City in order to develop some perception of dignity and safety in the 
 
62 It was always possible to find people willing to give blood. The tricky part was in finding the correct type 
quickly enough to do some good. 
63 British Red Cross Report, p. 4. 
64 Red Cross report, p. 18. 
65 Starr, p. 57. In contrast to the voluntary spirit epitomized by Oliver and the London Blood Transfusion Service, 
the Americans determined that the collection of blood could be a profitable industry. They were not wrong: 
students donated blood to pay tuition, while others sold their blood to purchase alcohol. 
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donor supply. Rules were codified and enforced to ensure that donors were providing the 
highest quality “product.” Donors were screened for diseases and alcohol or drug problems. 
Donors were expected to be available by telephone, and they were also under an obligation to 
give blood; if they did not donate when called upon, the donor lost the right to sell his blood.66
 In spite of the differences between the London and New York systems, the basic 
problem of finding blood suitable for transfusion was solved, however temporarily. Hospitals 
could rely upon a blood supply whenever they needed it, and organizations existed to ensure 
that the hospital received what it needed. Unfortunately, it only solved the problem in cities 
with both the hospitals and the infrastructure to support the blood collection organization. If 
blood ever needed to be transported for longer distances, or if donors were not readily 
available, the system would collapse. Of course, in the 1920s, this was not a problem at all 
because blood did not have to travel very far! 
“Start Bleeding”: Blood Transfusion on the Move 
Blood Transfusion Services underwent a revolution in the 1930s with the Spanish Civil War. 
Dr. Norman Bethune saw soldiers who needed blood being moved to the rear when he thought 
it made more sense for them to remain at the front while the blood came forward to the front. 
He obtained a van with refrigeration and storage equipment suitable for keeping blood fresh for 
up to a week. He and his fellow doctors were on call twenty-four hours a day and prepared to 
take blood wherever and whenever it was needed.67 Although Bethune’s system was 
innovative, it was not the standard for mobile blood services. Others learned from Bethune’s 
example, believing that blood could be supplied even in the midst of the confusion of war.  
 
66 “The Blood Transfusion Betterment Association of New York City,” Journal of the American Medical 
Association 110 (1938): 1248-52. 
67 Roderick Stewart, The Mind of Norman Bethune (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill, 1977), p. 56-57. 
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 As war with Germany became more likely, the British government prepared its citizens 
in a number of ways: it cleared hospitals, distributed gas masks, and recruited civilians to act as 
leaders in their communities. Blood collection and distribution, however, had not changed 
substantially in the fifteen years since Oliver. Even by 1938, the emergency stockpile in 
London totalled eight pints for projected casualties of 37 000 during the first week of a war.68
 A young pathologist named Janet Vaughan, believing that the government should do 
more to stockpile blood, began her own blood collection service in Hammersmith. She argued 
that doctors could better spend their time as healers rather than waste time drawing blood if 
Britain did go to war. Vaughan worked with other private blood bankers to create a proposal 
outlining the ways in which the government could ensure an adequate wartime blood supply. 
Using the estimates from the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Health, Vaughan could 
provide information on how many lives would be saved with specific investments from the 
government. The ministry was finally convinced, and on June 5, 1939, provided Vaughan with 
her funding.69 With this step, the British government became among the first in the world to 
get directly involved with the national blood supply.  
 Blood collection in Europe and North America, up until the twentieth century, had been 
a haphazard and imprecise process at best. This was mostly the result of superstition and a 
misunderstanding of the properties of this most precious human liquid. When the superstitions 
abated in the late nineteenth century and scientists began to examine more fully the uses of 
blood to human health, the question of responsibility for the collection, processing, 
organization, and distribution of blood became an important one. 
 
68 Alistair H. B. Masson, History of the Blood Transfusion Service in Edinburgh (Edinburgh and South East 
Scotland Blood Transfusion Association, n.d.), p. 24. 
69 Starr, p. 87. 
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 As we have seen, the Red Cross took a leading role in organizing both ends (collection 
and distribution) of the blood supply in Europe and North America. This, however, was not by 
design but by happenstance. The Red Cross took responsibility in Britain because an employee 
decided to take it upon himself to begin the donor recruitment process in an off-the-cuff 
manner. As knowledge about blood increased, the ability to store blood for longer periods did 
as well. This would prove invaluable during the Second World War, when the United States 
needed to ship blood overseas to Europe and the Pacific. The model created by Percy Oliver 
was improved and expanded to allow donors to give blood to be used as needed, instead of 
collecting “on-the-hoof.” 
 The war did a great deal to improve blood systems worldwide, but did not settle the 
question of governance. Volunteer organizations took control of the blood supply, but there 
was no governmental direction to create a cohesive system. As the organizers of the blood 
supply created a system based on immediate needs, there was no specific plan except to 
improve the blood system piece by piece. This had important implications in Canada, as we 
shall see in the next chapter. 
 
Chapter 4  
The Canadian Red Cross Society 
In 1863, the International Committee of the Red Cross was born. It consisted a group of Swiss 
citizens who – appalled by the aftermath of European war – wanted to make the world a better 
place. In regard to warfare, the Red Cross 
monitors the laws of war; visits prisoners-of-war and political detainees; acts as 
go-between and negotiator during hijackings and hostage takings; campaigns to 
control weapons; takes relief and medical help to the victims of conflicts; traces 
the ‘disappeared’; puts families separated by war in touch with each other and 
acts as custodian of the Geneva Conventions.70
 
In addition, as we will see, it acted as a collector and distributor of blood in many Western 
countries.  
A Helping Hand: The International Red Cross 
The First and Second World Wars saw great advances in the field of transfusion medicine. As a 
consequence, organizations that devoted part or all of their time to collection and distribution 
of blood and blood products worked harder to get their product out and to obtain “market 
share” in this necessary field. 
 In the inter-war period, scientists and entrepreneurs took time to learn about 
what others in the same field were doing and they improved upon the already 
established methods for the collection and distribution of blood.  
 Transfusion medicine specialists across the globe were busy in the twenty years 
following the First World War and were laying the groundwork for what would become a vital 
national service in Canada: the Canadian Red Cross Society (CRCS). This groundwork took 
                                                 
70 Caroline Moorehead, Dunant’s Dream: War, Switzerland, and the History of the Red Cross. (New York: 
Carroll & Graf Publishers, Inc., 1998), p. xxi. Although the cross in the Red Cross is taken from the Swiss flag 
and not the Christian symbol, the Red Cross is known as the Red Crescent in many non-Christian countries. 
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the form of an international Red Cross, which gave authority to national societies such as the 
CRCS. 
 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the parent organization from 
which all other Red Cross Societies sprang, provided guidance and direction for the other 
Societies in their humanitarian works. Among other things, the ICRC provided them with 
guiding – and inviolable – principles, forming the credo of all Red Cross Societies around the 
world. Its principles would prove to cause a number of problems in the Canadian situation 
because of the nature and operation of Canadian federalism. It is sufficient for now, however, 
to simply list the principles of the International Committee of the Red Cross: 
• Humanity 
The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of desire to bring 
assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavours, in its 
international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever 
it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health to ensure respect for the human 
being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, co-operation, and lasting peace 
amongst all peoples. 
 
• Impartiality 
It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class, or political 
opinions. It endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by 
their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress. 
 
• Neutrality 
In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in 




The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the 
humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective 
countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to 
act in accordance with the principles of the Movement. 
 
• Voluntary Service 
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• Unity 
There can only be one Red Cross or one Red Crescent Society in any one country. It 
must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory. 
 
• Universality 
The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in which all Societies  have 
equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other, is world-
wide. 71
 
 All National Societies derive their legitimacy from the International Red Cross and 
must abide by these principles. As an aside, only countries that are signatories to the Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies of the 
Field (1864) (and as revised later) may have National Societies. The implication is that only 
countries agreeing to a particular set of principles as laid down in the Convention may enjoy 
the protection and services of a Red Cross Society. The corollary here is that signatories to the 
Convention will also respect the principles of the Red Cross.72
The Canadian Red Cross Society 
The Canadian Red Cross, like so many other national societies, was born out of a major war 
and the perceived need to fill a gap that government neglected. In Canada’s case, the war in 
question was the 1885 Northwest Rebellion. At the time, army medical services were almost 
unknown. Indeed, a great deal of mistrust lay between the Red Cross and the armed services, 
which believed that civilians had no place “blundering around battlefields.”73  
 The Red Cross in Canada had its unofficial start in 1885 when Dr. George Sterling 
Ryerson, seeking protection for his ambulance, hoisted a makeshift Red Cross flag.74 In the 
 
71 http://www.redcross.ca/article.asp?id=000318&tid=001 About the Red Cross – Canadian Red Cross 
72 P.H. Gordon, Fifty Years in the Canadian Red Cross, p. 20-21. 
73 André Picard, The Gift of Death: Confronting Canada’s Tainted Blood Tragedy. (Toronto: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 1995), p. 19.  
74 http://www.cbc.ca/news/indepth/facts/red_cross.html, Indepth Backgrounder: Canadian Red Cross, April 2001. 
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finest traditions of the Red Cross, the flag offered protection and comfort to the wounded on 
both sides of the conflict.75
 Ten years later, when Ryerson was Surgeon-General, he wrote to the British National 
Society for Aid to the Sick and Wounded, also known as the British Red Cross Society. 
Ryerson wanted to establish a branch in Canada. He says in his memoirs that the St. John 
Ambulance Association, while capable, could not participate in military hostilities. He added, 
“its work was training men and women in first aid and home nursing and must in time of war 
be subsidiary to the Red Cross.”76 By 1896, however, Ryerson obtained permission from 
Britain to organize a Canadian branch of the Red Cross.77 After approving its formation, the 
British Red Cross Society suggested that the new branch incorporate itself under the following 
principles: 
1. That the branch shall be called ‘the Canadian Branch of the British National 
Society for Aid to the Sick and Wounded in War.’ 
 
2. That a council shall be formed of sufficient influence to give public confidence. 
 
3. That it be recognized that the primary work of the branch is to render aid to the 
sick and wounded in time of war by offering supplemental assistance: (a) To the 
Army Medical Department of Canada or (b) to the Parent Society, should 
England be engaged in war, (3) To the belligerents of any other countries 
engaged in war, who recognize the neutrality of the Red Cross and express their 
willingness to accept aid through the British Society by its Canadian Branch. 
 
4. That all its domestic affairs, such as enrolling members, collecting 
subscriptions, appointing officers, training nurses, etc., be entirely under its own 
control. 
 
5. That the work of the Red Cross Branch be kept entirely distinct from any branch 
of the St. John Ambulance Association, in Canada. 
 
75 Picard, p. 19. 
76 George Sterling Ryerson, Looking Backward. (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1924), p. 117. 
77 John Murray Gibbon and Mary S. Mathewson, Three Centuries of Canadian Nursing. (Toronto: The Macmillan 
Company of Canada Limited, 1947), p. 341. The Canadian Red Cross had to start off as a branch of the British 
Red Cross as Britain was the only country in the British Empire to have signed the Geneva Convention. As the 
colonies gained independence, they could sign the Convention and create Red Cross Societies in their own right. 
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6. That the special use for which the Red Cross badge was designed, under Article 
7 of the Geneva Convention, 1864, shall be borne in mind and all possible 
means taken to ensure its non-abuse.78 
 
The Canadian Red Cross Society was formed in October, and the British Society officially 
recognized it in December.  
 In 1898, the new Society performed its first active function by fundraising for the 
provision of aid in the Spanish-American War. However, no other work was done by the 
Society until 1899, when war broke out in South Africa. The CRCS sprang into action and 
organized the collection of supplies for the sick and invalid.79
 Wealthy members of the board funded the Red Cross until 1909, when the Canadian 
government passed the Canadian Red Cross Society Act, establishing the Canadian Red Cross 
Society. Under the Act, the CRCS had four purposes: 
1. To furnish volunteer aid to the sick and wounded of armies in time of 
war, in accordance with the spirit and conditions of the conference of 
Geneva of October, 1863, and also of the treaty of the Red Cross or the 
treaty of Geneva of August twenty-second, 1864, to which Great Britain 
has given its adhesion; 
 
2. To perform all the duties devolved upon a national society by each 
nation which has acceded to said treaty, but in affiliation with the British 
Red Cross Society; 
 
3. To succeed to and take over all the rights and property heretofore or now 
held and enjoyed by and all the duties heretofore performed by the 
unincorporated association known as The Canadian Red Cross society; 
 
4. In time of peace or war to carry on and assist in work for the 
improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of 
suffering throughout the world.80 
 
 
78 Ryerson, p. 118 
79 Ryerson, p. 121. Ryerson also notes that he “advocated work in time of peace to prepare for war.” If nothing 
else, this could have provided the CRCS with an opportunity to educate the public as to its purpose, something 
that Ryerson indicates had to be done anyway. 
80Canadian Red Cross Society, An Act to incorporate The (1909, c. 68)  
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 The Canadian Red Cross Society had a very broad mandate under the law, but nowhere 
does the Act give the CRCS the right to collect and distribute blood and blood products. The 
Society’s involvement with blood collection came gradually and haphazardly, to disastrous 
results in the 1980s. 
 During the First World War and in the inter-war period, the Red Cross was busy all 
around the world promoting its goals and providing medical services to civilians and soldiers 
alike. Ironically, however, the Red Cross became linked with patriotism instead of impartial 
humanitarianism, which helped the Red Cross raise money to further its goals. In Canada, $35 
million was raised.81 The Canadian Red Cross made further increases in the peace that 
followed in 1919, beginning a “post-war program of [public] health education”82  
 By 1918, the Red Cross worked to fight the influenza pandemic by providing comfort 
to the sick and dying and by producing a vaccine. Although this was not the only major work 
done by the Red Cross, the major publicity that the CRCS and other organizations brought to 
health issues suggested to the Canadian government that, although the provinces had 
jurisdiction over health, a national Department of Health was necessary.83
 By the start of the Second World War, the Red Cross had determined that it would find 
a peacetime role to play in addition to the wartime role it already had. When war broke out in 
1939, the CRCS put these plans aside and contributed to the war effort in a number of ways, 
which included providing processed blood to the armed forces. The Red Cross collected the 
whole blood product and shipped it to Connaught Laboratories for processing. Connaught had 
 
81 Picard, p. 20. This is not to suggest that the Red Cross acted unethically. However, the association of the Red 
Cross with helping sick and wounded in time of war led many people to believe that it was acting for nationalist 
purposes instead of the good of all people. 
82 http://www.redcross.ca/article.asp?id=007834&tid=019, 1900-1950 – Canadian Red Cross 
83 Picard, p. 21.This department would not interfere directly with the provinces, but was instead designed to deal 
with public health issues. 
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found a way to produce dried human blood serum, the only way to transport blood products to 
the armed forces.84 The Red Cross then sent the serum on to the armed forces. Of course, as the 
war effort required more and more blood, further donations were required. As donations 
increased, so too did the Red Cross’s role in actually processing the donations it collected.85
 It is important to note a number of things about this wartime collaboration and the role 
that the Red Cross played in collecting and distributing blood. As we observed in the previous 
chapter, the British Red Cross had already played a role in collecting blood for civilian hospital 
use in Great Britain. The Canadian Red Cross was only collecting blood on behalf of the 
military.   
 By 1940, the Red Cross had opened a permanent blood donor clinic in Toronto, where 
many of today’s standard donor practices were established. By 1942, clinics opened in six 
different provinces, but still more were needed. After all, to meet the increasing demand, 
clinics would have to be set up across the entire country. This move meant that the Red Cross 
was becoming an invaluable national program and one that required ever-increasing amounts 
of money, jumping from approximately $50 000 per year in 1940 to $700 000 by 1943.86
 By war’s end, the Canadian Red Cross Society had proved its worth to the military with 
its blood transfusion service. Medical authorities in the armed services listed blood as the 
single greatest factor in saving lives, above penicillin and sulfa drugs. As a result, the Canadian 
 
84 Horace Krever, Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada: Final  Report. (Ottawa: Minister of 
Supply and Services Canada, 1997), p. 44. 
85 
http://www.bloodservices.ca/CentreApps/Internet/UW_V502_MainEngine.nsf/resources/CBS+Performance+Revi
ew/$file/2002Review-1.pdf, CBS Performance Review 
86 Picard, p. 25. 
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Hospital Council, the National Research Council, and the CRCS formed a special committee to 
examine the possibility of forming a peacetime blood transfusion service.87  
The Canadian Red Cross Society did some very good work over the course of the war. 
It had created a national blood supply and had a division devoted solely to providing safe blood 
and blood products. It had developed a relationship with a private laboratory to ensure that 
blood products that the CRCS could not create were manufactured in a safe environment. Up 
until this point, it is important to note that the Red Cross Blood Transfusion Service (BTS) was 
totally separate from any government. The only relationship it had with a government was that 
the federal government – through the military – was the BTS’s only “customer.” The blood 
supply was run entirely by non-governmental organizations without directly receiving 
government money or support. That would all change dramatically in the post-war years. 
Blood Boom: The Red Cross, 1945-1973 
Before the war, there was no civilian blood system in place in Canada. Each hospital was 
responsible for supplying its own needs and generally did not look to other agencies for help in 
meeting a demand for blood.   
 Provincial governments and hospital associations, having seen the success of the Red 
Cross in dealing with the military’s blood supply, asked the organization to continue its work 
by operating a civilian collection service to meet the needs of both civilian and military 
hospitals. Dr. W.S. Stanbury studied the needs of Canadian hospitals with respect to blood, and 
 
87 McKenzie Porter, To All Men: The Story of the Canadian Red Cross (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, Limited, 
1960), p. 141. 
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his report created the system under which the Red Cross would operate: “the Red Cross should 
supply blood and blood products, free-of-charge, to all Canadian hospitals.”88  
 The war had allowed the Red Cross to create a monopoly for itself in the Canadian 
blood system. The geography of Canada allowed the Red Cross to do what no independent 
blood bank could do: it used an already-existing national organization to mobilize Canadians 
into giving blood for the war effort. The CRCS, using goodwill and a system established 
through its decades 
of work in Canada, answered the military’s call to provide blood for the war effort once again. 
When the war ended, independent blood banks did not have a chance to get set up as they did 
in the United States89 because the CRCS moved quickly into the civilian blood business as “the 
first free national blood service in the world.”90
 It is important to recognize a few things about the Canadian blood system at this point. 
First, there was no system as we understand it today. An organization had sprung up to fill a 
need. The Red Cross Blood Transfusion Services (BTS) continued to meet this need after the 
war was finished; no one else stepped in to take the role away from them. 
 
88 W. Stuart Stanbury, The Canadian Red Cross Society: Survey of Blood Transfusion Facilities in Canadian 
Hospitals and Proposed Plan for a Canadian National Blood Transfusion Service, (Toronto: The Canadian Red 
Cross Society, 1945), p. 16. 
89 Ironically, the independent blood banks competing in the United States with the American Red Cross mobilized 
to form the American Association of Blood Banks (AABB), an organization to which both Canadian Blood 
Services and the American Red Cross now belong for the furthering of transfusion medicine knowledge. 
90 Porter, p. 145. 
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 The blood system was also not under the control or strict supervision of any 
government, in spite of the fact that provincial governments provided significant funding to the 
blood system.91 The blood system certainly should have been, as the provincial and federal 
governments had shared responsibility for it. The federal government, through the Food and 
Drugs Act, regulates blood and blood products while the provincial governments provide 
funding through their individual health care services.92 However, since the federal government 
could not tell the provinces how to design and implement a national blood system, the Red 
Cross had to act independently of government in order to provide its services. This was 
certainly consistent with its charter, but not necessarily a good thing for the public it was trying 
to serve.  
 Finally, the system was created on an ad hoc basis; that is, as problems were 
encountered, they were fixed. There was no specific intent to create a “blood system”; the Red 
Cross simply created something as it went on: a permanent clinic here, a new blood centre 
there, a testing lab built as necessary. Unlike today’s world, a business plan, cost-benefit 
analysis and risk management programs were not necessary.  
 By its very nature, the Red Cross Blood Transfusion Service was a political creature. 
The Red Cross was generally voluntary in nature and required both people and large infusions 
of cash to stay afloat. The Red Cross expanded rapidly, and costs soon escalated out of control. 
The CRCS provided blood to the hospitals at no charge. This policy decision, combined with 
 
91 Sandra Rodgers, “The Canadian Blood Delivery System: Liability for Blood Related Injuries,” in J. Robert S. 
Prichard, Liability and Compensation in Health Care: A Report to the Conference of the 
Federal/Provincial/Territorial Review on Liability and Compensation Issues in Health Care; Appendix B: 
Research Papers Volume 3: Reform Proposals and the Canadian Blood Delivery System. (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1990), p. 5. 
92 Gilmore and Somerville, p. 130. 
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the expense of keeping up with advances in transfusion medicine, meant that the Red Cross 
required a serious amount of capital funding just to stay afloat.93
 By 1958, the financial burden had proven to be too much for the Red Cross. Repeated 
pleas to the provincial Ministers of Health were finally heard and Canadian governments 
started to provide some money for the blood transfusion service; the Red Cross continued to 
fund the blood donor recruitment end of the business.94 The governments began by paying 
thirty percent of the operating costs, but over fifteen years, the total amount of funding went up 
to ninety percent.95
 In the first few years of operation, the Red Cross’s Blood Transfusion Service was 
simple: Red Cross volunteers recruited donors while its paid employees collected, tested, and 
distributed the blood. The mission of the Red Cross was simply to get the blood out. Safety, 
government regulations, and standardized procedures were not yet introduced into the blood 
system. Moreover, the role of the federal and provincial governments was both undefined and 
almost non-existent. It seems the only role of the provincial governments was to pay for the 





ew/$file/2002Review-1.pdf, CBS Performance Review,  p. 18. 
94 
http://www.bloodservices.ca/CentreApps/Internet/UW_V502_MainEngine.nsf/resources/CBS+Performance+Revi
ew/$file/2002Review-1.pdf, CBS Performance Review, p. 18. 
95 Krever, p. 46. 
96 Krever, p. 45. 
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Loss of a Kingdom: The Red Cross, 1973 – 1982 
It is important to remember that there was a great deal of shared governance responsibility 
between the federal and provincial governments. Constitutionally, it was (and is) the 
responsibility of the provincial governments to provide health care. Hospitals are governed by 
the provinces; hospitals need blood as a part of their operations, and so the provision of blood 
and blood products is therefore a provincial responsibility. On the other hand, the federal 
government has responsibility for the regulation of pharmaceuticals, of which blood is one. 
However, Red Cross Blood Transfusion Service operations were funded and overseen by the 
provincial governments. The only real influence the federal government had was in the 
provision of funds to the provinces and/or to license and inspect the Red Cross operations.97
 1973 was the last year the Red Cross retained any financial responsibility for the 
Canadian blood system. In its twenty-five years of existence, the Red Cross blood services had 
gone from having almost total control over the blood system to abdicating it entirely to 
government. In 1948, the Red Cross had responsibility for the blood system under the very 
general supervision of the provincial governments. In 1974, the Canadian Hematology Society 
released a report suggesting that the Red Cross might not be doing the best job it could in 
running the Canadian blood system. This independent report led the provincial governments to 
create the Federal-Provincial Program and Budget Review Committee, which committed the 
provincial governments to pay for all of the technical costs and forty percent of donor 
recruitment costs for the Red Cross.98 Because of the increased funding, the governments also 
started to take a more active role in the governance of the Red Cross as a provider of blood and 
 
97 Norbert Gilmore and Margaret A. Somerville, “From Trust to Tragedy: HIV/AIDS and the Canadian Blood 
System,” in Eric A. Fedman and Ronald Bayer, eds. Blood Feuds: AIDS, Blood, and the Politics of Medical 
Disaster. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 130. 
98 Picard, p. 35. 
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blood products. This is not to suggest that the provincial governments were not already 
interested in the governance of the blood system. However, the Canadian Hematology 
Society’s report led the provinces to take more control over the blood system; the Red Cross 
lost some of its independence and started providing a service to the ministries of health. This 
move, in turn, required still more government intervention in the workings of the blood system. 
 The federal Minister of National Health and Welfare (now called the Minister of 
Health) articulated the federal government’s position on the Red Cross’s governing principles 
for the Canadian blood system in 1976. He said that Canada’s blood supply should be based on 
three main points: 
• Voluntary donation 
• National self-sufficiency 
• Gratuity of blood products to recipients 
The provincial governments agreed, and at a conference the following year added a fourth: 
• Desirability of non-profit domestic fractionation99 
 This additional principle was a part of the Red Cross’s murky relationship with 
Connaught Laboratories, which could be described as a “marriage of convenience” early on. 
However, it became a very different marriage in the late 1970s. Connaught had been a 
successful private laboratory for decades, but started losing money and was no longer viable as 
a private enterprise. The federal government purchased Connaught through the Canada 
Development Corporation, meaning that all facets of the Canadian blood supply were under the 
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provincial governments, while federally-owned Connaught provided the Red Cross with a 
product called fractionated plasma.100
 This, then, was the situation at the end of the 1970s: the Canadian blood supply was in 
the hands of an independent organization that had administered and funded the collection of 
blood for approximately thirty years. The Red Cross, while independent in its operations and 
principles, had its blood services in turn audited and overseen by the federal government and 
funded by the provincial governments. The federal government also owned Connaught 
Laboratories, which sold the Red Cross a finished product created from plasma provided by the 
Red Cross. In other words, “the Canadian blood system was a world unto itself.”101 On the 
other hand, it could be argued that, for the first time, the governments responsible for health 
care and regulation were fully overseeing the Canadian blood system. 
 Once government got more involved in the blood system, governance became more 
difficult. In addition to the bureaucratic structures already in existence at the Red Cross, the 
national organization reported to federal, provincial and territorial ministers of health. Efforts 
to streamline the process got worse under both the Canadian Blood Committee and the 
Canadian Blood Agency, both of which will be discussed below. 
 A brief look at the governance structure of the Red Cross and its Blood Transfusion 
Service in the late 1970s reveals a number of competing jurisdictions. First the Red Cross 
served the principles outlined at the beginning of this chapter. As we know, adherence to these 
principles was a requirement for carrying the name “Red Cross.” Moreover, the Canadian 
government underscored that requirement in the Canadian Red Cross Society Act, when it 
 
100 The Krever Report goes into some detail on what blood products were created by the Red Cross and 
Connaught, but this information is not important for the purposes of a discussion on Red Cross/CBS governance. 
101 Gilmore and Sullivan, p. 130. 
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referred to the Red Cross treaty, Geneva Conventions, and even the British Red Cross Society, 
from whom the Canadian Red Cross Society originally received legitimacy. 
 The principles of the Red Cross required that it be an independent, neutral body, free 
from government regulations. However, when the federal and provincial governments started 
to provide funding to and regulation of the Society, the spirit of the principles was somewhat 
compromised. However, there was nothing to suggest to the Red Cross that it should change its 
modus operandi; there was no national blood policy among so many actors.102
 This is not a new concept in Canada. The federal system under which the governments 
operate ensures that, when national interests compete with provincial jurisdiction, difficulties 
will occur. A prime example is the state of Canadian highways, where the Canada Highway 
Act (1919) allows the federal government to both impose nationwide standards and help co-
ordinate provincial efforts on this score.103 In some ways, this was difficult because the 
provinces have primary jurisdiction on roads, but the federal government wanted to ensure a 
national standard. Ultimately, the provinces were able to co-operate on building the Trans-
Canada highway (with financial help from the federal government), and a national highway 
policy came about. This is similar to the federal government’s role in the Canadian Red Cross 
Society’s Blood Transfusion Service. Although the federal government could have taken a 
leadership role within the Canadian blood system because of its regulatory role, it did not, 
leaving policy and governance decisions up to the other actors, although in this case, the 
governments never created an explicit national blood policy. 
 
102 Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada: The Canadian Red Cross Society Submissions, Volume 
I. (Toronto: Canadian Red Cross Society, 1996), p. 5. (Hereafter known as CRCS Submissions) 
103 Mathieu Turgeon and François Vaillancourt, “The Provision of Highways in Canada and the Federal 
Government,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism. 32:1 (Winter 2002), p. 163. 
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 The Blood Transfusion Service department of the Canadian Red Cross was part of a 
larger bureaucratic structure and was, in some ways, just part of a larger organization whose 
head was not necessarily a transfusion medicine expert or someone who completely understood 
the ways in which the blood service worked. The head of the Red Cross might very well not 
understand the importance of the blood system and its peculiar regulatory requirements. This is 
important, as the blood system was not always the top priority for an organization whose 
primary mission moved from wartime work and disaster relief to include public health 
programmes after the First World War.104
 The next major problem was that the governments responsible for governing the Red 
Cross during this time “didn’t feel compelled to regulate the Red Cross because of its 
reputation.”105 The only organization to which the Red Cross blood program was responsible 
did not force the responsibility while the Red Cross, as shall be seen, did not always know 
what it was doing. By not acting, the provincial governments allowed an unspeakable tragedy 
to occur. “Benign neglect” is the phrase that best sums up the governmental custody of the 
Canadian blood supply. 
 Finally, the basic reporting structure of the Red Cross to the federal and provincial 
governments underwent a number of changes in fifteen years. Not even the major players 
always knew how to react or when they should have been reacting in the first place. 
 These three factors determined the root causes of the massive blood tragedy that would 
follow and the horrible consequences for thousands of its victims. Let us take each one of these 
governance issues in turn. 
 
104 Canadian Red Cross in War and Peace. (Toronto: Canadian Red Cross Society National Headquarters, 1935), 
p. 25. 
105 Gilmore and Sullivan, p. 131. 
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 The Canadian Red Cross Society is a part of the larger International Red Cross, which 
has its base in Geneva, Switzerland. Its creation has already been discussed, so what is 
important to note is the international character of the Red Cross; it is designed to span all 
borders and do work as an impartial body.  
 The International Red Cross is governed by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross. This committee is responsible for creating the general policy of the Red Cross and 
performs a number of useful functions for all the Red Cross Societies around the world. 
Structurally, however, it is an enigma. As Caroline Moorehead put it, the International 
Committee: 
• Calls itself international; yet is a private Swiss company, based in Geneva and 
governed by twenty-five Swiss citizens. 
 
• Has its roots in precedence and institutional memory; yet thrives on action and 
sometimes seems curiously uninterested in history. 
 
• Employs ‘delegates’ – some eight hundred in 1997, for the most part Swiss – who 
gather information about torture, ‘disappearances’ and summary executions that no one 
else has access to; yet under its mandate cannot reveal to the public or media what they 
know.106 
 
The International Committee’s responsibility was and is to maintain  
close relations with the National Societies, cooperating with them in areas of 
mutual interest such as preparedness for situations of armed conflict, respect for, 
development and ratification of the Geneva Conventions, and dissemination of 
the Fundamental Principles. The ICRC also assumes the general management 
and coordination of international relief operations conducted by the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent in situations of armed conflict.107
 
The International Committee does not govern the Red Cross Societies of each country directly; 
instead, it co-ordinates their work and acts as an administrator of the Red Cross brand name so 
 
106 Moorehead, p. xxi, xxii. 
107 http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList140/D81C252443CE59BEC1256B660058D535, The ICRC 
and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. 
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that signatories to the Geneva Convention can be sure that the Red Cross Society from one 
country acts in the same way as a Red Cross Society from another. 
 National Societies all fall under the auspices of the International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The Federation deals with the international aspects of the 
National Societies, promoting co-operation between them and providing an opportunity for the 
sharing of ideas to serve their respective countries better.108
 In terms of national blood programs, these two organizations were not directly involved 
with the Canadian blood supply. Instead, the Federation worked to give “assistance to national 
societies in the establishment and development of blood transfusion services”109 The 
Federation provided a forum for international discussion and co-operation between the 
different National Societies, each of whom had a different blood program, different needs, and 
a different level of involvement in their nation’s blood supply.110 Ultimately, it is up to the 
individual Society to run itself within a given country. In other words, the Canadian Red Cross 
Society, though part of a larger group of Red Cross Societies, was on its own when dealing 
with blood problems in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 In 1982, just before the blood tragedy started, the Red Cross was organized in an 
extremely complicated manner in Canada. This is shown in two somewhat simplified diagrams 
on the next two pages (Figures 1 and 2). 
 
108 http://www.ifrc.org/who/movement.asp, Red Cross Red Crescent – a history 
109 S.R. Hollan, W. Wagstaff, J. Leikola, F. Loth, eds. Management of Blood Transfusion Services. (Geneva: 
World Health Organization, 1990), p. 222. 
110 Hollan et. al., p. 222. 
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Figure 1: Red Cross Organizational Chart 
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Figure 2: Red Cross and its relationship to the governments 
Provincial/Territorial Governments 
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The various divisions of the Red Cross elected three members to represent their interests at a 
national meeting. These people (thirty in all) elected the officers of the organization: the 
president, vice-president, treasurer, counsel, chair of the national planning and budget review 
committee, chair and vice-chair of the national blood transfusion service advisory committee, 
and the chair of the national field services committee. This group also made up the executive 
committee of the board of directors. The board of directors included each of the officers and 
one person from each of the ten provincial divisions and one to five other persons. The board 
also hired a secretary general to assist with day-to-day operations. 
 The Red Cross blood program had two branches: the blood transfusion service and the 
blood donor recruitment program. Only the former had direct representation on the board of 
directors, although this changed after 1986 with a reorganization that moved the blood donor 
recruitment committee to a subcommittee of the blood transfusion service committee. 
 The blood donor recruitment program was almost entirely volunteer-based, in 
accordance with the Red Cross’s long-standing policy on voluntary service. Volunteers 
recruited volunteer donors under the general direction of the paid national co-ordinator of 
blood donor recruitment and the national blood donor recruitment committee. The committee 
was made up of volunteers who represented constituent interests and paid employees who had 
expertise in recruitment issues. The total number on the committee fluctuated between nineteen 
and twenty, but was still a rather large working group. 
 The blood transfusion service was made up almost entirely of paid employees, with the 
exception of the blood transfusion service advisory committee, which was made up of 
volunteer medical and scientific experts. The committee provided advice to the national 
director of the blood transfusion service and reported to the board of directors. 
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 The Red Cross blood program, however, was just one small part of the larger Red 
Cross, fitting in as one small part of an enormous operation that included disaster relief, 
emergency services, water safety services, first aid services, and homemaker services.111 
Although some of the smaller committees had medical and scientific experts, the board of 
directors ultimately responsible for the Red Cross’s direction were not always experts and the 
blood program only had two votes on a board of thirty. 
 The federal Ministry of Health is responsible for regulating the blood program and 
ensuring that it meets the health and safety standards set for it by the federal government. The 
Ministry of Health and Welfare Canada’s Health Protection Branch was responsible for a 
number of different health branches, including the drugs directorate. The Bureau of Biologics 
was responsible for regulating the Canadian blood system, as blood is considered by the federal 
government to be both a drug and a “biologic.” The regulatory agency has undergone a great 
deal of change over the last thirty years, but one thing that is striking is the approach to 
enforcement of regulations: it was considered one of “voluntary compliance.” The Health 
Protection Branch (of which the Bureau of Biologics was a part) wanted to work with the Red 
Cross and other entities to ensure that complex issues could be dealt with adequately.112
 In addition to the issue of voluntary compliance – as opposed to forced compliance –  
the Red Cross’s blood products were not even regulated by the federal government until 1989, 
when blood was added to the Food and Drugs Act. The Red Cross was responsible for the 
safety and quality assurance of all its operations: collection, testing, processing, storage, and 
distribution of whole blood and its components.113
 
111 Krever, p. 52-54. 
112 Krever, p. 113. The argument for voluntary compliance was that one tended to comply when the inspector 
could say, “Do this voluntarily, or else…” 
113 Krever, p. 116. 
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 This is not to say that the federal government and Red Cross did not communicate 
about issues relating to the blood system’s regulation. Rather, the Bureau and Red Cross held 
regularly scheduled meetings and the Red Cross invited Bureau personnel to advisory 
subcommittee meetings so that the Bureau of Biologics would be kept up-to-date on issues 
facing the Red Cross. Testimony at the Krever Inquiry said: “We [the Bureau] were still aware 
of what the Red Cross was doing. We had contact with them. But it was not as good as if they 
would have been licensed.”114
 At the Krever Inquiry, testimony touched on two reasons for treating the Red Cross’s 
blood program as a special case: the Red Cross’s reputation and the complicating factor of 
provincial involvement in the blood system. Put simply, the Red Cross’s reputation as a 
humanitarian organization was such that a change in Bureau policy would require a decision at 
the highest levels. Moreover, the Bureau was already seen as overworked and understaffed; 
since the Red Cross was self-regulating and since there had been no problems to that point, 
extending regulatory control over the Red Cross was not seen as a priority. 115 Unfortunately, 
this meant that anything the Red Cross asked for, it got. The federal government put a rubber 
stamp on any requests sent to it for licences, operating procedures, and even self-inspection.116
 De-regulation was a hot topic in the early 1980s, so the federal government tried to 
download regulatory authority to the provinces. The provinces did not want to pay the costs 
associated with federal regulation, so self-regulation continued unabated. 
 
114 Krever, p. 136. 
115 Krever, p. 139. 
116 Picard, p. 185. 
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 In the run-up to the Krever Inquiry, arguments were made that the blood program was a 
national system co-ordinated by the Red Cross and paid for by the provinces, which were 
responsible for health care: “Blood and blood products are freely exchanged between 
provinces; distribution, therefore, is on a national basis.”117 However, the Red Cross centres 
mostly kept the blood within the province from which it was collected. Exceptions were made 
in cases of emergency, but since the program was paid for separately by each province, “the 
inventory of collected blood was managed as nine separate entities rather than as one national 
resource.”118
 Ironically, the provinces were also one of the most important components to the Red 
Cross organization. Dr. Roger Perrault, who was the national director of blood services from 
1974 until 1986, said that policy and funding were the primary roles for the provinces.119 Of 
course, this also meant that the provinces had to have a significant say in both the regulation 
and the overall policy direction of the Red Cross.  
  The provincial role in the governance of the Red Cross Blood Transfusion Service 
changed over time. Initially, the provinces played no role in funding or governing the Red 
Cross, but as provincial and federal requirements for blood changed, so too did the provincial 
role in the blood system.  
 Over the course of almost thirty years, the provincial and federal governments went 
from being disinterested spectators to actors engaged in the blood supply system. As 
governments invested more and more public money into the Red Cross operation, provinces 
necessarily became more interested in the ways in which their money was spent. Moreover, the 
 
117 Parsons, p. 19. 
118 Krever, p. 54. By this time, Québec had pulled out of the national system to deal with the Red Cross on its 
own. 
119 Parsons, p. 19. 
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federal government owned Connaught Laboratories, making the entire blood supply system an 
arm of the federal and provincial ministries of health. 
 The move to own and operate Canada’s blood system came gradually to the provinces 
and was always in response to an external force requiring them to become more involved in 
some aspect (usually financial) of the blood system. 
 By 1974, it was clear that the Red Cross was no longer a charitable activity and so 
government support increased in recognition of this new reality. The Federal-Provincial 
Program and Budget Review Committee voted to cover all of the Red Cross’s technical costs 
and forty percent of its donor recruitment costs. Governments were all on side with the notion 
of the Red Cross as a government-supported supplier of blood and blood products. The 
governments believed that they were so fortunate that their arrangement with the CRCS set up 
the road for disaster later on. By giving the Red Cross an open-ended, unwritten contract with 
assurance that governments would pay the bills, they lost the opportunity for political oversight 
at this critical stage. 120
 In 1976, the provincial, territorial, and federal Ministers of Health articulated their four 
principles that should govern the Canadian blood supply.121 However, these principles did not 
embody a national blood policy, making Canada one of the few industrialized countries that 
did not have a national policy.122 As Dr. Perrault, former head of the Red Cross’s Blood 
Transfusion Service, said, “So essentially what you had was a national system for blood 
delivery in a system that was strictly provincial.”123 He further noted that there were a number 
of governance factors, including the pan-Canadian nature of a Red Cross-run blood supply, the 
 
120 Picard, p. 35. 
121 See page 44. The fourth principle was not added until 1979. 
122 CRCS Submissions, Volume I, p. 48. 
123 Dr. Perrault’s testimony in CRCS Submissions, Volume I, p. 5. 
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funding responsibility of the provincial governments, and the regulatory responsibility of the 
federal government. His conclusion was that the only group that could be in charge of the 
Canadian blood supply was the Red Cross; no other actor in the system understood blood in the 
same way as the CRCS.124
 The federal/provincial group responsible for governing the blood supply was called the 
Federal/Provincial Program and Budget Review Committee. Its mandate was very specific: 
In recognition of the principle that this service constitutes a national program, 
the federal government, with regional advice and in consultation with provincial 
health insurance authorities, shall have authority to evaluate the budgets and 
programs of the Blood Transfusion and Donor Recruitment Services of the 
Canadian Red Cross Society. 
 
The federal government, in conjunction with at least one provincial 
representative, shall approve the final budget annually and advise the provinces 
of the total cost of the programs, the approved new programs and respected 
provincial allocation of costs on an agreed basis of allocation.125
 
This new committee reported to the deputy ministers of health and was made up of 
representatives of the civil service in western Canada, Ontario, Québec, and Atlantic Canada. 
Québec pulled out of the committee in 1979, and the Red Cross had to make a separate report 
and budget for the work it did in the province.126 From that point on, Québec dealt with the 
Red Cross on its own terms, although it did periodically participate in decisions with the other 
provinces. 
 Quebec’s withdrawal from the inter-provincial committee is another indication of 
politics at work in the Canadian blood system. Ironically, the decision to sign an independent 
deal with the Red Cross led to yet another study of the blood supply: the Inter-Provincial Ad 
Hoc Committee on a Canadian Authority on Blood Policy. Both this committee and the earlier 
 
124 CRCS Submissions, Volume I, p. 5. 
125 CRCS Submissions, Volume I, p. 23.  
126 Krever, p. 49-50. 
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Ad Hoc Committee on Plasma Fractionation (called the Chapin Key Committee after its chair, 
British Columbia’s deputy minister of health) recommended that representatives from all the 
provinces and the federal government form a board that would carry out some of the tasks 
previously carried out by the governments. It would “create broad policy guidelines, allocate 
funding, and ensure compliance with standards. It would not, however, operate or manage the 
blood system [but would] approve budgets and audit expenditures.”127
 The Committees also recommended that this group be a not-for-profit organization to 
which the governments would delegate authority to enter into contracts with the CRCS and any 
Canadian fractionators. It would, in essence, co-ordinate all activities related to the Canadian 
blood supply, including collection, manufacturing, distribution, and regulation.  
 However, Ontario, Québec, and Manitoba opposed what they saw as a loss of control. 
In fact, the Ontario Minister of Health said: 
… It seems to me that, certainly, a lot is to be said for an ongoing inter 
provincial advisory body, but, as far as this key issue is concerned, I just can’t 
see that my Government could turn that over and lose any direct control of what 
happens in our Province.128
 
Compromises were made, and the provincial governments ultimately agreed on a slightly 
modified version of the Chapin Key recommendation.  
 Quebec’s decision to pull out of the inter-provincial decision-making conferences led 
directly to these reports and their recommendations. Because the province used its bargaining 
power to push for what it wanted, other provinces started asking the question, “who controls 
the blood system?” and started working to ensure that they put in place a structure to deal with 
“command and control” issues.129
 
127 Krever, p. 94. 
128 Conference of Provincial Health Ministers, September 30 October 1, 1981, St. John’s, Newfoundland. 
129 Picard, p. 89-90. 
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 In 1982, the provinces created a new committee: the Canadian Blood Committee. Its 
purpose was “to direct the Canadian blood system in accordance with the principles established 
by the Ministers of Health for the therapeutic use of human blood, blood products or their 
substitutes.”130
 Governments had stopped working together for a common good as they had in the war 
years and were engaged in direct competition over every tax dollar. The Red Cross, in the 
provincial view, could be a source of jobs for a poorly performing economy and every 
province wanted a direct say in its governance. Moreover, they each wanted credit for the 
success of the Red Cross.131
 The competitive nature of provincial politics was a small part of the neglect inherent in 
the Canadian blood system. From the Red Cross’s entry into the civilian blood system in 1946 
until 1981 when the Canadian Blood Committee was created, there was a combination of 
politics and neglect at work. Provinces gradually took over governance and funding for the Red 
Cross Blood Transfusion Service, but never took responsibility for it. The Red Cross lost some 
of its neutrality and independence when it accepted money from the provinces for providing 
this vital service; unfortunately, the Red Cross did not see that the provinces left responsibility 
for the proper functioning of this service up to the CRCS. 
 
 
130 CRCS Submissions, Volume I, p. 31. 
131 Picard, p. 88. 
 
Chapter 5 
 A New National Blood System? 
The provinces created the Canadian Blood Committee (CBC) in order to help them deal more 
effectively with the Red Cross. The Red Cross had but a single view: to deliver blood and 
blood products to those who needed them. Provinces, however, had a responsibility to deliver 
all kinds of health care services to their citizens, and the Canadian Blood Committee could 
have played a role in both arenas. 
 Krever notes that the Red Cross had a somewhat poor relationship with the Canadian 
Blood Committee, due in part to the complex nature of the CBC and in part because of the 
principles by which the Red Cross had to operate. The Red Cross opposed the creation of the 
committee under the argument that it had to remain independent according to its founding 
principles. The fact that the provinces paid the bills and thus made the Red Cross a contractor 
for the operation of the blood supply seems to have been irrelevant.132
The Canadian Blood Committee: A Government Failure 
Tensions between the Canadian Blood Committee and the Red Cross were evident at the 
outset, when the CRCS rejected the phrase “to direct” in the CBC’s purpose. Moreover, while 
the CRCS did not object to government oversight of its operations, it did have some concern 
that “government funding of the Canadian blood program was now evolving into government 
direction and control.”133
                                                 
132 Picard, p. 90-91. 
133 CRCS Submissions, Volume I, p. 33. 
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 The committee’s terms of reference were approved before the CRCS had an 
opportunity to comment, but the provinces – in a 1981 conference of ministers of health – 
approved the eleven objectives by which the CBC would operate: 
1. To establish policies with regard to the following: 
a) the collection of blood, including plasmapheresis; 
b) the processing of blood; 
c) the distribution of blood products; 
d) the utilization of blood products; 
e) operational research; and 
f) support and maintenance of the four enunciated principles 
concerning blood and blood products. 
 
2. To recommend allocation of resources to meet costs of implementing the 
above policies. 
 
3. To assure adherence to established policies by the Canadian Red Cross, 
plasma fractionation plants, and others involved in the collection, 
processing, distribution, and utilization of blood and blood products. 
 
4. To consult with the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce on 
appropriate policies for the export and import of human blood and blood 
products. 
 
5. To consult with the Bureau of Biologics, Department of National Health 
and Welfare, on appropriate policies for the regulatory control of the 
collection, processing, and distribution of blood, blood products and 
their substitutes. 
 
6. In the short term, to monitor the development of fractionation plants to 
ensure that their establishment is in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Ministers of Health and allocate resources and 
priorities for their implementation. 
 
7. To determine the real costs of producing blood fractions for Canadians 
and the shareable portion of capital costs to be added to the price of 
blood fractions. 
 
8. To ensure that standards for blood, blood products and blood substitutes 
are developed, and to monitor that such standards are met. 
 
9. To review and approve the programs and budgets of the Blood Donor 
Recruitment and Blood Transfusion Services of the Canadian Red Cross 
Society, subject to the concurrence of all  Provinces and territories. 
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10. To report annually to the Ministers of Health on all activities of the 
Committee 
 
11. To be a national forum for the various organizations and associations of 
the Canadian blood program to discuss issues, and to coordinate the 
activities related to the management of the Canadian blood system.134 
 
The Canadian Blood Committee was clearly an ambitious step designed to solve a number of 
the problems that had plagued the Canadian blood supply to this point. Its purpose was defined, 
and its objectives, while not necessarily measurable, were clear. The governments of Canada 
and the provinces were taking steps to ensure that the Canadian blood supply had clear policy 
objectives and the resources to fulfill them. However, the collaborative facade of the CBC 
quickly started to crack under a variety of pressures. 
 The CBC should have been a forum for the provincial, territorial, and federal 
governments to determine blood policy for the country. In reality, however, the territories 
never sent a representative to the meetings, and Québec did not join the committee until 1983, 
although it did send observers starting December, 1982. Public accountability was practically 
unheard of behind the committee’s closed doors.135
 To make matters worse, the committee was powerless, since it was unable to make 
major budget determinations, to enter into contracts, or to bind the provinces to a decision 
made at the CBC. Essentially, the Canadian Blood Committee acted as a common meeting 
point for the various government representatives to receive information and report back to their 
respective governments for instructions. Provinces at that point had the opportunity to concur 
with the committee’s recommendations or make separate arrangements with the Red Cross. 
Nowhere was this more evident than in the creation of a national blood policy. 
 
134 Krever, p. 95-96. 
135 Gilmore and Somerville, p. 131. 
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 In the midst of a national blood system, the Canadian Blood Committee was a 
confederacy: provinces appointed representatives to a national body, but they retained all 
decision-making powers.  
 The creation of a national blood policy was understandably a complex issue. Numerous 
requests from the CRCS had gone unheeded and the country’s blood supply had no formal 
guiding mechanism. As one of its first tasks, the Canadian Blood Committee set out to rectify 
the problem. Minutes from a December, 1982 meeting speak to the committee’s intent: 
“Members of the CBC recognized the need and the urgency of developing such a policy, as 
approved by the Conference of Ministers of Health.”136 As this policy was never created, 
however, the truth of this statement remains in doubt. 
 Certainly, however, the CBC set up a framework for the creation of this policy. They 
agreed that any national blood policy should be far-reaching and include the four elements of 
such a policy created by the Ministers of Health in the 1970s as well as eight other 
components: 
• The terms of reference of the Canadian Blood Committee and its authority; 
• The applicability of the policy to the Canadian Red Cross Society, the fractionation and 
related industry, and all governments; 
 
• The role and corporate principles of the Canadian Red Cross Society and its contractual 
relationship with governments and hospitals; 
 
• International provisions; 
• Authority for product standards development, implementation, and control; 
• Authority for policy decisions, implementation, monitoring and appeal; 
 
136 Krever, p. 102. 
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• Recognition of blood as a public, national, and limited resource; 
• Research and development137 
 Over the next six years, the CBC drafted and re-drafted its policy, requesting input 
from some forty stakeholder groups in the process.138 By 1989, however, the committee 
believed that the 1979 objectives enunciated by the ministers of health were insufficient and 
that a new framework for the blood system had to be created. These new components, signed 
off by the Ministers, were: 
1. The voluntary system should be maintained and protected. 
2. National self-sufficiency in blood and plasma collections should be encouraged. 
3. Adequacy and security of supply of all needed blood components and plasma fractions 
for Canadians should be encouraged. 
 
4. Safety of all blood, components, and plasma fractions should be paramount. 
5. Gratuity of all blood, components and plasma fractions to recipients within the insured 
health services of Canada should be maintained. 
 
6. A cost-effective and cost-efficient blood system for Canadians should be encouraged. 
7. A national blood program should be maintained.139 
Many of these seemed to be “motherhood and apple pie” issues, as they were a part of what the 
Red Cross had done all along. The Ministers of Health readily accepted the new principles, but 
no national blood policy was forthcoming. 
 What is interesting about the new principles is that no one seems to have objected to the 
mutual exclusivity of numbers 4 and 6. The provinces required that safety be paramount; if it is 
truly the most important issue, how does cost play a role? As a result of this dichotomy, trade- 
 
137 Krever, p. 103. The provinces and Krever both use the word “principles” to describe these elements of the 
blood system, but it does not seem to be the best possible descriptor. 
138 Krever, p. 103. 
139 Krever, p.103-104. 
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offs had to be made to reconcile competing requirements. If safety is paramount, who defines 
safety? Moreover, who defines what costs need to be incurred to provide this safety? Without 
further explication, the Ministers of Health put the Red Cross into a position where it could be 
condemned for actions it did not take while at the same time allowing the Red Cross a way out 
if things went bad by couching the principles in vague, ambiguous language.140
 Why was a national blood policy so important to the organizations within the system, 
especially the Red Cross? As the principal actor in the blood system, the Red Cross had run its 
operations with very little oversight from governments of any level. Although the operation of 
Canada’s blood supply came under the jurisdiction of the provincial Ministers of Health, the 
Red Cross was still largely unaccountable for its actions. 
 However, since governments were now (with the full funding provided to the Red 
Cross’s blood program) at least technically responsible for the blood supply, it became more 
important to have the roles and responsibilities of each actor clearly identified. Otherwise, 
there was the potential for the Red Cross to be micromanaged by government ministries, which 
was clearly in contradiction to its governing principles.141 This did not even appear to matter 
all that much because the CBC was incapable of responding to the problems it did face. 
Individual provincial ministers did not press the committee for action, but the committee at the 
same time did not demand answers from the different governments.142
 A national blood policy would give the Red Cross a measure of autonomy in that its 
role would be clear and it would also provide a means to ensure that it was acting within the 
principles of the International Red Cross. 
 
140 John Hoey, “The sensibility of safety: reflections on the Krever inquiry’s final report,” Canadian Medical 
Association Journal. Jan. 13, 1998; 158(1), p. 60. 
141 See pages 34-35 for a fuller discussion. 
142 Gilmore and Somerville, p. 134. 
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 The lack of a national blood policy was only one of the points of tension between the 
CRCS and the CBC. As a result, the relationship between these bodies deteriorated to an 
unacceptable level. The Red Cross required at once both policy guidance from the provincial 
governments but at the same time needed independence from them. Moreover, the CBC had its 
own internal conflicts to deal with. It had competing political agendas from the thirteen 
governments playing their own roles and was a toothless body, subordinate to the whims of the 
same government agendas. Ultimately, the CBC would complete some good work but fail 
because of its relationship with the Red Cross and its relationship with the provincial 
governments. 
 The two parties primarily responsible for the Canadian blood system rarely had a good 
relationship with one another, stemming from competing perceptions about their respective 
roles in the Canadian blood supply. On the one hand, the Red Cross believed that it should 
have a great deal of autonomy in the blood supply, owing to its historic role and in the 
principles defined by the International Red Cross. The CBC, on the other hand, had a claim to 
running the system because of the governmental role played in its makeup. 
 Ultimately, of course, it was the responsibility of both the federal and provincial 
governments to ensure that the blood supply was safe; the federal government was responsible 
in a general nature for the regulation of blood products, while the provincial governments were 
responsible for the actual delivery of health services.143 These governments had delegated their 
responsibility for the blood system to the Canadian blood committee. However, the CBC did 
not have the resources, authority, or accountability to fulfill its mandate.144
 
143 The federal Ministry of Health did not completely regulate the blood industry until 1989.  
144 CRCS Submissions, Volume I, p. 86. 
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 In the opinion of the Red Cross, the role of the CBC was to provide direction “in the 
form of policy development so as to provide a framework for the CRCS to fulfil its function as 
the operator of the blood program and distributor of blood products.”145 In reality, however, the 
CBC exercised a great deal of control over the Red Cross. Although this sounds strange, given 
the inability of the CBC to fulfil its mandate, it is all a matter of perspective. The Red Cross 
believed that the CBC spent a great deal of its time interfering with blood program operations, 
but the provincial governments did not provide it with the ability to do much of anything. In 
fact, in spite of the noble-sounding principles in the committee’s terms of reference, its real 
purpose was for governments to keep a measure of control over the CRCS: 
For Canada’s ministers of health, protecting the blood system from the threat of 
disease wasn’t an issue worth exploring, but determining the ‘shareable portion 
of capital costs to be added to the price of blood fractions’ was a priority. With 
no legislative authority, no scientific knowledge and no public accountability, 
the CBC did little more than approve the funds it turned over to the Red Cross 
each year…146
 
In some ways, this approach made sense: Red Cross costs were paid by the province in which 
they were incurred, and as a result there was a great deal of opposition to transferring blood 
and blood products across provincial borders without the approval of the Canadian Blood 
Committee.147 Unfortunately, the provincial representatives on the committee were not as equal 
as their positions on the committee would otherwise indicate. Some representatives were as 
high as the Deputy Minister level, but others were two, three, or four levels below that. Often, 
they had to delay a decision while consulting with the provincial offices to which they were 
responsible.148
 
145 CRCS Submissions, Volume I p. 35. 
146 Picard, p. 93. 
147 Krever, p. 104. 
148 CRCS Submissions, Volume I p. 37-38. 
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 The CBC and CRCS never came to an agreement regarding the roles each would play 
within the Canadian blood system. While the CBC was primarily responsible for approving the 
CRCS budget, it also meant a great deal of uncertainty when it came to the responsibilities of 
the Red Cross. The former National Director of the CRCS’s Blood Transfusion Services, Dr. 
Roger Perrault, wrote: 
In 1982, we felt that the role of the Canadian Blood Committee could well 
evolve towards that of a “Management Board” for the Blood Programme: this 
was raised in the C.R.C.S. April 1982 response to the C.BC. terms of 
reference… 
What are the exact decisions that the C.R.C.S. can make? Number of staff 
appointments, rate increases, increases in the use of supplies and allocations of 
equipment, programme expansion (e.g. Plasmapheresis), choice of fractionators, 
conditions under which fractionators will be paid, etc. are all areas where 
C.R.C.S. has very little choice in the matter. The choice between one supplier 
and another is subject, in certain circumstances, to the political process of the 
governments.149
 
Throughout the 1980s, the CBC took control of the Canadian blood supply by stealth. 
Although it did not really run the system, it made all budget decisions for the CRCS in a line-
by-line examination of each year’s budget (a process that could take six months to complete). 
The budget was submitted to the Canadian Blood Committee in September for the start of the 
CRCS’s fiscal year in January.150 CBC members, responsible to their provincial governments, 
saw the budget broken down province-by-province and centre-by-centre. Each representative 
had limited budgetary approval authority, requiring them to ask for justification of budget 
items, ask for a reduction in the budget requests, or time to consult with their province’s 
Treasury Board. As a result, budgets were almost never approved prior to the beginning of a 
fiscal year. 
                                                 
149 Position Paper by Dr. Perrault, December 2, 1985. Emphasis in original. 
150 Krever, p. 104. 
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 In addition to the complex nature of the budgeting process, the scrutiny given to the 
Red Cross budgets by the CBC meant that any changes to the budget in the fiscal year required 
prior approval. Even issues as small as permitting the Red Cross to hire full-time staff 
members in entry-level positions required approval of the committee. Moreover, the budgets 
were approved on a province-by-province basis; funds allocated to one provincial centre could 
not be transferred to another. Within a centre, however, funds could be reallocated without 
justification as long as the bottom line remained the same.151
 Part of this was due to the lack of a national blood policy and part of it was because of 
the murky lines of authority between the CBC and Red Cross. Indeed, an ad hoc working 
group of Deputy Ministers of Health concluded in 1989 that a new group with the authority to 
operate the blood system on behalf of all the governments in Canada needed to be created. It 
noted: 
The separation of funding responsibility from the management decisions of the 
CRCS inevitably results in governments becoming involved in some day-to-day 
management issues and the CRCS being unable to pursue corporate objectives 
due to lack of financial resources under direct control.152
 
 The Red Cross submissions to the Krever inquiry provide a number of examples of 
cases in which the provincial governments, through the CBC’s oversight, interfered with Red 
Cross management decisions. Generally, these involved specific areas of funding: human 
resources, where the Red Cross could not hire full time personnel without specific 
authorization; provincial budget lines, which required the CRCS to keep money from one 
province for use by the blood centres within that province; major capital expenditures required 
CBC approval, as did almost any unexpected expense.153  
 
151 CRCS Submissions Volume I, p. 67-72. 
152 Final report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Deputy Ministers of Health, August 25, 1989. 
153 CRCS Submissions Volume I, p. 72-73. 
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 The Canadian Blood Committee was a good idea implemented poorly. It sought to 
create a body accountable for the operation of the Canadian blood system, but it micromanaged 
the provider of this national resource in such a way as to make the delivery of a national blood 
system all but impossible. The Red Cross could not do the job it needed to do under the 
constraints of the Canadian Blood Committee’s often cumbersome processes. The provinces 
retained their authority for health care while at the same time demanding a national blood 
system; the two objectives were mutually exclusive. 
 In 1991, the unworkable relationship between the Canadian Blood Committee and the 
Canadian Red Cross Society was dissolved and the Canadian Blood Agency was created. The 
goals of the new blood authority were laudable, but the damage to Canada’s blood supply had 
already been permanently done. 
 By 1991, it was apparent that the Canadian blood system was not working as well as it 
could otherwise. The federal government had just started fully regulating the Red Cross 
through its Bureau of Biologics. The provincial governments funded the Red Cross BTS and 
were supposed to provide broad policy direction through the Canadian Blood Committee. 
However, the CBC took on a greater than intended role by examining the budget to such an 
extent that it interfered with the CRCS’s operations. This in turn led to resentment on the part 
of the Red Cross which led to a poor relationship between the two organizations. 
 Ultimately, the Canadian Blood Committee and the Canadian Red Cross could not 
work together because of ambiguity surrounding their roles in the Canadian blood supply. The 
lack of a national blood policy coupled with an overreaching oversight committee led to a 
constant tug-of-war between the two. The federal government formed the Canadian Blood 
Agency (CBA) in 1991 to replace the CBC. 
 
COLLABORATION, COMPETITION, AND COERCION:  PAGE 72 
CANADIAN FEDERALISM AND BLOOD SYSTEM GOVERNANCE 
 
                                                
 Before the CBA could be formed, the actors within the system had to make some 
specific determinations as to what the Canadian blood system was and the role that each would 
play within it. First, however, they had to determine what was meant by the seemingly 
interchangeable phrases “Canadian blood system” and “national blood supply program.” The 
latter phrase, however, has a more narrow definition, consisting of Health Canada’s Bureau of 
Biologics and Radiopharmaceuticals (the regulator), the Canadian Red Cross Society (the 
operator), and the new Canadian Blood Agency (the co-ordinator/funder). The Canadian blood 
system has a broader reference, including ministries of health, hospitals, private blood groups, 
physicians, patients, blood donors, and blood advocacy groups.154  
 This distinction between two terms is important because it helps to remind the actors 
within the blood supply that they are a part of a bigger cause: the safety of the blood system is 
dependent on them and their actions. It is with this distinction in mind that we move to discuss 
the creation of the Canadian Blood Agency. 
Too little, too late: the Canadian Blood Agency 
In contrast to the Canadian Blood Committee, the CBA entered into existence with some 
forethought. The provincial governments created it as a federal not-for-profit corporation. 
Unlike the CBC, the new Agency could enter into contracts independently of governments and 
fund the blood agency on their behalf. Specifically, the Canadian Blood Agency existed 
To direct, coordinate and finance the various elements of the Canadian Blood 
System requiring national direction in accordance with the principles 
established by the Honourable Ministers of Health of the Provinces and 




154 CRCS Submissions, Volume IV, p. 5. 
155 Krever, p. 1004.  
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The Red Cross remained as the medium through which the blood system operated, but the 
CBA operated as the governmental link. The Canadian Blood Agency was a creature of the 
provinces, designed to work on their behalf to direct the Red Cross’s blood system from vein to 
vein (i.e. the recruitment, collection, processing, and distribution of blood and blood products). 
 The ministers of health were all members of the new agency, but there was still 
contention between the Red Cross and its government overseers over the issue of Red Cross 
independence. Former Red Cross secretary general Douglas Lindores testified at the Krever 
Inquiry: “we will do the best we can to cooperate with the Canadian Blood Agency, but … we 
do not consider ourselves bound by directives received from the Canadian Blood Agency.”156
 The Red Cross was also reforming itself at the same time. Its blood operations had 
evolved over time in a mostly ad hoc fashion, and the Blood Transfusion Service business 
model had not been particularly well thought out. This was consistent with the way the Red 
Cross saw itself (that is, as a medical service) but was not conducive to the national demands 
of blood donor recruitment and manufacturing. As a result, the Red Cross underwent a series of 
internal changes in the early 1990s, including recruitment of professional managers to run the 
blood centres instead of physicians and the implementation of the Good Manufacturing 
Practices program.157
 In spite of these reforms, the working relationship between the CRCS and the CBA did 
not improve from the relationship with the CBC. This problem became apparent during the 
Krever Inquiry when a safety audit committee investigated the relationships in the blood 
supply. It concluded that one of the reasons for the problems within the Canadian blood supply 
 
156 Krever, p. 1005. 
157 Krever, p. 1005. Medical doctors still held positions at the CRCS but they were advisory in nature. The Good 
Manufacturing Practices model is similar to ISO standards in that they produce a quality product safely and 
consistently. 
 
COLLABORATION, COMPETITION, AND COERCION:  PAGE 74 
CANADIAN FEDERALISM AND BLOOD SYSTEM GOVERNANCE 
 
                                                
was the structural arrangement between the regulator, operator, and funder. It noted 
specifically that the CBA appeared to have been created solely to act as a way to keep costs 
under control and that the CRCS was used to a sense of historical independence. The safety 
audit committee also said that the antagonistic relationship between the two bodies and the 
attendant governance difficulties could have affected safety issues.158 In other words, the 
“new” governance structure achieved none of the goals it set out to accomplish. 
 Within two years of its creation, the CBA-CRCS relationship came under additional 
fire because of the Krever Inquiry into the catastrophe of the mid-1980s. The Krever Inquiry 
will be more fully discussed, but it is important to remember that all of the of the decisions 
made by the CBA and CRCS as of this point came under intense public scrutiny before the 
blood system changed hands yet again in 1998. 
 Justice Krever’s safety audit committee noted three things that needed to change before 
progress could be made in the Canadian blood supply system: 
• The federal and provincial governments had to create some sort of governing 
document clearly outlining responsibilities; 
 
• The parties involved had to come to an agreement on an interpretation of the principles 
set out by the Ministers of Health; 
 
• Planning, priorities, and funding issues all had to be better developed between the 
CBA and CRCS.159 
 
 
158 Krever, p.1007. 
159 Krever, p. 1006. 
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None of these items was resolved before 1995, when the provinces, territories, Canadian Blood 
Agency, and Red Cross finally created a master agreement between themselves. Under the 
Master Agreement, the governments would provide the CBA with funds with which to pay for 
the blood system (although the governments had representation on the CBA, they did not have 
a direct role in determining budget policy); the CBA would create policy, determine the 
collection targets, and pay for the Red Cross Blood Transfusion Services; the CRCS would 
comply with all Health Canada regulatory requirements and ensure the safety of the national 
blood supply.  
 The Master Agreement, however, did not solve some of the problems already inherent 
in the system. For example, it did not differentiate between broad policy direction and specific 
management issues affecting the safety of blood. This put the CRCS and CBA into conflict 
almost immediately.160
 These issues were not resolved even a year later, when the federal, provincial, and 
territorial governments undertook a study on the blood system to recommend reform. The 
conflict between the Red Cross and the CBA and the governments was foremost on everyone’s 
mind. The Canadian Blood Agency, for example, speculated that the problem lay in the Red 
Cross’s demand for independence from governments. It argued that any national blood supply 
program had to report directly to a government or to the Agency in order to eliminate this 
problem. The Red Cross, however, said that the problem lay in its lack of control over policy 
and funding co-ordination. The CRCS pointed out that the federal government requires a 
certain level of safety for which it has no role in funding, while provincial health ministries that 
 
160 Krever, p. 1011. A team of management consultants hired by the Inquiry believed that the Master Agreement 
was not a great change and that the construction of the blood system did not allow for anything but conflict (p. 
1015). 
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want to lower costs control the CBA. The Red Cross is caught in the middle, and is least able 
to create a solution.161
 The Red Cross and CBA did not have a good working relationship from the beginning. 
There was too much baggage carried over from the Canadian Blood Committee. By the time 
reform could even begin, the Krever Inquiry started, putting all the actors of the blood system 
under a microscope. 
 After fifty-one years of working with Canadian governments, the Red Cross found 
itself in the middle of an important debate over the future of its role in the Canadian blood 
system. It was continually in conflict with the governments ultimately responsible for the 
Canadian blood supply and was now at the Centre of a massive controversy. Ultimately, it 
would withdraw from the blood system, but not before considerable damage had been done.  
 In 1992 and 1993, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Health and Welfare, 
Social Affairs, Seniors, and the Status of Women held hearings into the Canadian blood system 
to both reassure the Canadian public and to determine the causes of the contamination of the 
blood supply. Its report, however, produced more questions than it answered. Its 
recommendation was that a judicial inquiry be held; it further said that all governments should 
agree to its terms of reference, but Ottawa must also be prepared to act alone if necessary. This 
was due to the fact that the provincial governments chose to drag their feet. The governments 
all knew that they were culpable in the blood tragedy and wanted to avoid the political 
consequences of such an inquiry.162  
 By September 1993, all the governments of Canada (with the exception of Québec) 
recommended that a public inquiry be established. Justice Krever says in his report that, 
 
161 Krever, p. 1020. 
162 Picard, p. 189. 
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although the Québec government was not part of the original call for an inquiry it did co-
operate when the hearings came to the province.163 Although the move to establish the Krever 
Inquiry was a good one politically, the provincial governments also tried to cover their backs. 
While the Inquiry would review all aspects of the blood system, the mandate also ensured that 
there would be no findings of fault. The health ministers also committed very little money and 
time to the Inquiry. They even went so far as to commission their own ninety-day review, 
hoping to make internal changes quickly enough to “solve” the problem.164
The Krever Inquiry 
In October, 1993, the Governments of Canada, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, and 
Saskatchewan separately appointed Justice Horace Krever to investigate the tainted blood 
tragedy.165 This thesis has not explored the events surrounding the tainted blood scandal 
because it is not directly germane to the issues of governance in Canada. Essentially, the Red 
Cross and the governments of Canada and the provinces were slow to act in implementing 
testing for the HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis C viruses in the early 1980s. Although other 
industrialized countries put these tests into place, the Canadian blood system did not use the 
safeguards available to it. Suffice it to say that the Red Cross and its government overseers had 
not done what they needed to do to protect the blood supply from the hepatitis and AIDS 
viruses. 
 Justice Krever was to “review and report on the mandate, organization, management, 
operations, financing and regulation of all activities of the blood system in Canada, including 
 
163 Krever, p. 5 and 1108. Québec held its own inquiry, the Gélineau Commission, which recommended a number 
of things that are now part of Héma-Québec. 
164 Picard, p. 191. 
165 Each of the three provinces had its own legislation applicable to Royal Commissions, so each had to appoint 
Justice Krever separately. 
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the events surrounding the contamination of the blood system in Canada in the early 1980s.”166 
The Commission’s terms of reference gave Justice Krever almost unlimited authority to 
investigate the blood system by examining the organization, both past and current (at the time) 
of the blood system, any relevant interest groups, and asked him to investigate the structures 
present in other countries.167
 Justice Krever was asked to report to the Cabinet by September 30, 1994 with 
recommendations for the future of the Canadian blood system, including the roles and 
responsibilities of the governments and the Red Cross and actions required to implement his 
recommendations.168 Ontario, PEI, and Saskatchewan also appointed Justice Krever to provide 
them with similar information under applicable provincial laws. 
 The Krever Commission heard from 474 infected people, the Canadian Red Cross 
Society, the Canadian Blood Committee, the Canadian Blood Agency, provincial and local 
public health officials, community organizations, physicians, and medical experts. More than 
sixty groups and individuals submitted reports to the Commission.  
 The hearings started in November, 1993 and ended in December, 1995, more than a 
year after Justice Krever’s final report was due.169 An interim report outlining the basic facts of 
the blood tragedy and some early recommendations was submitted to the federal government 
on 15 February 1995. In the interim report, Justice Krever outlined some of his 
recommendations to the various governments of Canada. The governments, in turn, used 
Justice Krever’s interim report as a basis on which to start reform of the system. We will 
 
166 Government of Canada Commission to Justice Horace Krever (Appendix A, p. 1081 of the Krever Report) 
167 Government of Canada Commission to Justice Horace Krever (Appendix A, p. 1082 of the Krever Report) 
168 Government of Canada Commission to Justice Horace Krever (Appendix A, p. 1083 of the Krever Report) 
169 Ironically, the politics surrounding the tainted blood tragedy continued right up to the end of the Inquiry. The 
federal government refused to turn over a number of Cabinet minutes. These documents would have shown that 
the federal government did not act quickly to extend regulatory control over the CRCS in the early 1980s. 
(Gilmore and Somerville, p. 147.) 
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discuss these recommendations (along with Justice Krever’s final recommendations) in the 
next chapter. 
 Justice Krever’s final report, tabled on November 26, 1997, changed the face of the 
Canadian blood supply forever. It forced the governments of Canada to take a systematic look 
at the organization that had provided this vital service for over half a century. The governments 
had to look at their relationships with each other and the ways in which they governed a 
national blood supply. No longer could the governments rely on the goodwill of Canadians 
when it came to the blood supply. The Red Cross could no longer claim to be the best judge of 
what was good for the blood supply; it had clearly failed in its task. 
 However, there was some good coming out of the report. The federal and provincial 
governments now had an opportunity to construct a blood system from the ground up, learning 
from the mistakes of the past and demonstrating to Canadians that a single, national blood 
system could earn their trust and fulfill its task. In spite of the long way a new blood authority 
had to go, governments could see opportunity rising. It is the efforts of these governments and 
the result of their labours – the formation of Canadian Blood Services – that we will discuss in 




Canadian Blood Services 
The Krever Inquiry shook the very foundations of the Canadian blood supply. It brought to the 
fore issues that had been simmering for decades. The Red Cross lost the trust it spent fifty 
years accumulating and its role in the Canadian blood supply was severely damaged. The 
provincial, territorial, and federal governments had to take a close look at their roles in funding 
and governing the blood system, and Justice Krever’s interim and final reports offered them the 
opportunity to do so. The only questions remaining were: would the governments’ more active 
role in the blood system make things better and would the governments be able to co-operate 
when they had thus far failed to do so?  
 By 1994, the blood controversy had had an effect on operations at the Red Cross. 
Donations were down considerably and various organizations criticized the level of safety 
within the Red Cross.170 This criticism led to threats from the Red Cross that it would leave the 
blood business entirely unless the federal and provincial governments made significant changes 
to the system.171
 Even before Justice Krever issued his final report, the public discussion over the blood 
system and its governance led to a number of different improvements on the way the blood 
system worked. These improvements started when the Red Cross made its intentions public. 
 Doug Lindores, the Secretary General of the Canadian Red Cross Society, said that the 
CRCS had plans to update its equipment and procedures to meet the significantly more 
stringent requirements in the United States. One of the reasons the CRCS had not already 
implemented these plans was that the Canadian Blood Agency refused to approve the new 
                                                 
170 Maclean’s, Sept. 19, 1994, p. 22 
171 Toronto Star, October 2, 1994, p. A3. 
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funds. Lindores further argued that it was this inability to fund the blood system properly that 
led to the breakdown in the 1980s and that if the provincial governments did not find a way to 
co-operate on blood issues, the Red Cross would withdraw entirely.172  
 Although we already know the outcome of this ultimatum, it is important to reflect on 
what it meant at the time and what it shows us about the nature of the blood system in the mid-
1990s. Governments responsible for funding a toothless Canadian Blood Agency were also in 
the midst of dealing with crushing deficits and cries for greater fiscal responsibility. Political 
realities meant that new funds were not available, even to improve safety in the blood system. 
The Red Cross, however, did not want to lose the battle for public opinion just because the 
provinces would not provide the necessary money to create even the illusion of safety. 
 The word “illusion” is used advisedly in terms of politics; in this case, its use does not 
presume an intent to defraud the public. As the saying goes, politics is perception. This is even 
more true when it comes to issues of health as the public wants nothing more than to be sure its 
safety is of the highest importance to governments and service providers. These same 
governments failed in the 1980s to ensure that the blood system operated the way it needed to. 
The Red Cross, in an effort to salvage its own reputation and in order to ensure its continued 
place as the operator, made it clear to governments and the public that it would no longer take 
on the tasks assigned to it without more appropriate funding levels. Its threat to leave the 
operation of the blood system completely to the governments never came to pass, as the 
governments tried to work towards a better funding and governance arrangement; the situation 
was supposed to improve and the actors in the blood system tried to correct the mistakes of the 
past.  
 
172 Toronto Star, October 2, 1994, p. A3. 
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 By 1995, the Red Cross, provincial and territorial governments, and the Canadian 
Blood Agency entered into a Master Agreement that was designed to clarify the roles and 
responsibilities of each actor within the blood system. Under the agreement, the provinces 
provided appropriate levels of funding to the Canadian Blood Agency after the CBA approved 
the Red Cross’s budget plans. The CBA would create policy for the blood program on behalf 
of the provincial governments, while the Red Cross would ensure that its blood products met 
both Health Canada’s requirements as well as the highest possible standards for safety, 
efficiency, and efficacy.173
 The Master Agreement also clarified and interpreted the seven principles governing the 
Canadian Blood System that had been affirmed in 1989. Although the clarification did help 
eliminate some ambiguities, it did nothing for others. The conflict between safety and cost was 
not resolved, for example, and the CRCS and CBA continued their uneasy relationship. If 
safety was truly paramount, as the principles articulated by the Health Ministers stated, then 
the Red Cross must go about providing the safest possible product at whatever cost was 
necessary (unless, of course, the governments provided direction on how to deal with the cost 
issue). However, policy guidance and money were both provided by the Canadian Blood 
Agency, which was itself “tightly controlled by health ministries who are preoccupied with 
lowering costs.”174 It is important to note once again that the federal government was not 
involved with the governance of the CRCS, but was instead responsible for regulating the use 
of blood and blood products. Decisions it made about safety requirements – and the Red Cross 
was responsible for complying with those requirements under the Master Agreement175 – had 
 
173 Krever, p. 1011. 
174 Red Cross Submissions, Volume IV, p. 12. 
175 Krever, p. 1011 
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no effect on the federal budget but had a huge impact on the provincial governments 
responsible for providing funds to the Red Cross. As the CRCS argued in its submissions to the 
Krever Inquiry, it is required to provide a national service without any input into either funding 
levels or regulatory requirements.176
 The 1995 Master Agreement took a problematic relationship and formalized it without 
solving the basic structural issues. The Red Cross Submissions document pointed out that the 
cost and safety debate is one that should place governments front and centre. Too often, 
however, this responsibility was downloaded to the Red Cross because the CBA and 
governments required too much information, delayed funding decisions, and did not provide 
clear direction to the CRCS.177  
 As required by the original Order-in-Council, the Krever Commission released an 
interim report early in 1995. Although the report did not lay blame or draw any conclusions, it 
did report on the state of affairs found at many blood centres across Canada. Moreover, the 
interim report made a number of recommendations to the governments to improve safety and 
communication within the blood system. These recommendations formed the basis of the 
negotiations among the provincial ministers of health to create a new blood authority. 
The Interim Report 
Order-in-Council P.C. 1993-1879, which established the Commission of Inquiry on the Blood 
System in Canada, required the Commissioner, Justice Horace Krever, to “submit an interim 
report … on the safety of the blood system, with appropriate recommendations on actions that 
 
176 Red Cross Submissions, Volume IV, p. 12. 
177 Red Cross Submissions, Volume IV, p. 12. One such example occurred shortly after the Master Agreement 
came into effect. A new test for Creutzfeld-Jakob disease came available. The Red Cross determined that it 
needed money to implement this test, but the CBA could not make a decision about the policy or funding. 
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might be taken to address any shortcomings.”178 Although this report was due in May, 1994, 
Justice Krever did not submit it until February, 1995. Even with the extra ten months, the 
report was not complete, as Justice Krever himself admitted in the opening pages. 
 The Commission did not draw conclusions or pass judgment on the blood system in 
Canada, but it did address a number of shortcomings and made recommendations as to possible 
solutions. The first, most obvious conclusion has been noted earlier: the blood system did not 
have a cohesive structure, existing as it did with responsibilities delegated to a number of 
different parties, each with varying levels of power and obligation. 
 The interim report discussed a number of things related to the safety of the blood 
system in Canada. As a result of the preliminary hearings and discussions, Justice Krever made 
forty-three recommendations to the Governor-General-in-Council, all dealing with safety and 
technical issues. In fact, he noted that “the decision-making structure of the [blood] system, 
referred to by the safety audit committee as ‘governance,’ is an issue that I expressly leave 
open for my final report.”179
 Even though governance is not specifically addressed in the interim report, it was still 
affected by the report’s 1995 release. This report was the catalyst for change and action among 
the governments, providing specific recommendations to the Red Cross and Canadian Blood 
Agency as well as a hint of what might come in the final report. 
 The Commission highlighted some of the safety shortcomings of the blood system (it 
focused specifically on the introduction of the Good Manufacturing Practices Quality System) 
which led the provincial premiers to step in and work with the Red Cross, CBA, and other 
 
178 Government of Canada Commission to Justice Horace Krever (Appendix A, p. 1083 of the Krever Report). 
179 Horace Krever, Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada: Interim Report. (Ottawa: Minister of 
Supply and Services Canada, 1995), p. 40. 
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stakeholders to reform the blood system in such a way that these safety concerns, along with 
other structural issues, could be addressed. 
Enter the politicians: The Ministers of Health begin talks of reform 
A year after the interim report came out, the federal Minister of Health called on his 
counterparts to start planning for the Krever Commission’s final report and the changes to the 
blood system it would require. On March 11, 1996, Health Minister David Dingwall 
announced the opening of discussions on the future of Canada’s blood system. The 
announcement said that all groups involved with the blood system should be represented in 
restructuring, but wanted to meet specifically with the provincial and territorial ministers of 
health to discuss a governmental response to the issues raised in the interim report.180
 It is interesting to note that this is the first time governments took an active part in a 
policy issue concerning blood services in Canada. While governments were involved in 
previous discussions, the blood system had always been under the control of the Red Cross, 
and the federal and provincial Ministers of Health played only a small part. With the early 
recommendations from Justice Krever’s report and the resulting political fallout – after all, 
governments were supposed to protect the Canadian public from dangers in the blood system! 
– the provincial, territorial, and federal health ministers took action. 
 
180 Health Canada news release. March 11, 1996. 
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 When the ministers met in Ottawa on April 25, they started the process to transform the 
Canadian blood system. As with any process, a clear “big picture” was more important at the 
beginning than a fine-tuning of the existing blood system. Although it is tempting to treat the 
ministerial discussions and negotiations as part of an inevitable chain of events as part of an 
overall plan, these discussions took place in the mid-1990s, before the final Krever Report and 
before the creation of Canadian Blood Services. 
 Both the Canadian Blood Agency and the Canadian Red Cross Society were still 
responsible for Canada’s blood system. The Red Cross continued to collect, manufacture, and 
distribute blood.  
 Before dealing with the results of this first post-interim report meeting, it might be 
instructive to recall the main players of the day:  




Prince Edward Island Liberal (Progressive Conservatives 
elected 18 November 1996) 
Nova Scotia Liberal 
New Brunswick Liberal 
Québec Parti Québecois 
Ontario Progressive Conservative 
Manitoba Progressive Conservative 
Saskatchewan New Democratic Party 
Alberta Progressive Conservative 
British Columbia New Democratic Party 
 
 The group of people making decisions about the blood system came from very different 
political backgrounds, believing in different ideologies and believing different things about the 
place of the governments (both federal and provincial) in Canadian society. They were all 
politicians, however, with a desire for re-election and retaining power for their respective 
 
COLLABORATION, COMPETITION, AND COERCION:  PAGE 87 
CANADIAN FEDERALISM AND BLOOD SYSTEM GOVERNANCE 
 
                                                
parties. As a result, any changes to the blood system required both a resolution to the problems 
Justice Krever identified in his interim report and the acceptance of those solutions by the 
Canadian people.181  
 On April 25, 1996, the federal, provincial, and territorial ministers of health (except 
Quebec)182 announced a number of general principles related to reform of the blood system. 
They reaffirmed the four basic principles governing the health system: 
• Safety of blood supply is paramount 
 
• A fully integrated approach is essential 
 
• Accountabilities must be clear 
 
• The system must be transparent183 
 
None of these principles was new; they had been part of the official doctrine of the blood 
system since the 1970s, when the governments began funding the Red Cross on a more regular 
basis. It was, however, important to re-state these principles as a starting point for reform. The 
ministers added that any reforms should include governments and should ensure that all roles 
and responsibilities are clear for all parties. Specifically, they said that they wanted agreement 
on how blood and blood products would be used and managed nationally; what parts of the 
blood system would be integrated into provincial health systems and what parts would be 
managed nationally; they also wanted agreement on a single agency responsible for the blood 
system. After this meeting, the ministers of health tasked their departments to look for options, 
 
181 There is no direct evidence to suggest that partisan politics played a great role in the decision-making process 
of the ministers of health in 1996, but politicians have constituencies and a responsibility not just to “the system,” 
but to their governments, constituents, and parties. The logical link is clear: any response to the problems of the 
blood system had to be on solid political ground. 
182 Québec pulled out of national blood initiatives at this point and started to work on its own blood arrangements. 
Some of the details of the “made-in-Québec” system are discussed below. 
183 Health Canada News Release, April 25, 1996. 
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consult with stakeholders, and report back so that real work on reform could begin in 
September, 1996.184
Changing of the Guard: Transition from Red Cross to Canadian Blood Services 
When the ministers of health met again in Toronto on September 10, they agreed on a plan to 
create a brand new national blood authority. Specifically, the new authority would be 
accountable to Canadians, but would also operate “at arm’s length [sic] from all 
governments.”185 Very little mention has been made of the seeming incompatibility of this 
idea. How can an organization that purports to be accountable to Canadians operate at arm’s-
length from the only institutions which are legitimately held responsible by the citizens who 
elect them? After all, this very issue is one of the reasons the Red Cross ran into trouble: it did 
not want to compromise its neutrality and independence from governments, but at the same 
time ran the blood system with money from the provincial ministries of health. 
 Many people initially thought that the Red Cross would remain a part of the Canadian 
blood system. As the problems inherent to a voluntary, politically impartial organization 
running a highly technical, politically charged, governmental service came to light, more and 
more people questioned the need for blood services to remain a part of the Canadian Red Cross 
Society. 
 Even the Red Cross Board of Governors questioned it, although they did so for their 
own reasons and much earlier than did the governments and staff of the CRCS. In October, 
1995, the governors met to discuss an impending fiscal crisis. Specifically, funding the blood 
programme was draining the scarce resources of the charity and the board looked at making 
major financial changes. There were two options: the Red Cross could pull out of the blood 
 
184 Health Canada News Release, April 25, 1996. 
185 Health Canada News Release: “New blood system announced,” September 10, 1996. 
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system to stop the drain, or it could push the governments for more money and borrow until the 
money arrived. When the gambit to obtain more money from the governments failed, Red 
Cross president Janet Davidson informed the provinces that they would need a new blood 
services provider unless they put up more cash.186 In fact, the Red Cross had a significant 
financial problem for a number of years leading up to this point: 
Table 2: Red Cross Blood Transfusion Service Revenues/Expenditures 
Fiscal Year Revenues Expenditures Surplus/Deficit 
1990-1991 $197,340,000.00 $200,034,000.00 -$2,694,000.00
1991-1992 $213,235,000.00 $218,720,000.00 -$5,485,000.00
1993-1994 $244,626,000.00 $248,179,000.00 -$3,553,000.00
1994-1995 $265,386,000.00 $289,490,000.00 -$24,104,000.00
1995-1996 $311,343,000.00 $326,839,000.00 -$15,496,000.00
1996-1997 $305,976,000.00 $308,776,000.00 -$2,800,000.00
 
Source: Red Cross Annual Reports, 1990-1997 (Reports unavailable for 1992-1993) 
 
 With the Red Cross pushing for more money, agency officials publicly suggesting that 
the Red Cross pull out of the blood system, and cash-strapped governments looking for ways to 
save money and save public face in light of the tainted blood scandal and Justice Krever’s 
interim report, the time had come to consider other options for the blood system. 
 It is important to remember that it was not just negative factors influencing the 
departure of the Red Cross from Canada’s blood system. There were two major considerations 
that led to the decision of the Red Cross to remove itself from the system in which it had been 
a central component. First, the provincial governments had to re-define the blood system in 
such a way that it met the criteria of the principles they set down in the spring of 1996. The 
Red Cross could certainly have been involved in a more accountable system, except that it 
could not violate its principles of impartiality and political neutrality, as discussed in chapter 4. 
                                                 
186 André Picard, “Internal Bleeding,” Saturday Night (October 1996), p. 31. Interestingly, although the provincial 
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As a result, it would be extremely difficult to create a system whereby the blood system’s 
governance was ultimately accountable to the Canadian people through the provincial ministers 
of health. A second matter, perhaps more important, was that the blood business in Canada – 
and worldwide – was no longer just a charitable function. Although the Red Cross garnered 
fame for its charitable work, the blood business required a particular kind of expertise that the 
Red Cross could not – or would not – necessarily provide.187  
 The negative publicity, the interim Krever recommendations, the governance issues, 
and the new perceived requirement for a specialized agency meant that the ministers of health 
began considering new options for Canada’s blood supply. In February, 1997, the ministers 
issued a press release detailing the work done so far and their plans for the future. This release 
included all the provincial and territorial ministers except Quebec, whose plans did not include 
direct co-operation with the other governments. This is discussed more fully below. The 
ministers’ announcement came a full two months before Justice Krever’s report was due. As a 
result, they informed Canadians that, though their work continued, it would be subject to 
reviewing the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry.188 The backgrounder attached 
to the news release made a number of significant points: 
• The deputy ministers of health from the federal, provincial, and territorial governments 
oversaw the transition to the new blood system; 
 
• The implementation team consulted with community groups, medical and technical 
experts, and many other stakeholders to create a completely  new system; 
 
• Discussions with the Red Cross as to its role in the system were ongoing; 
 
 
governments kept increasing funding to the blood system, the Red Cross still ended up with a $24 million shortfall 
in 1994-1995. 
187 Picard, “Internal Bleeding,” p. 37. 
188 Health Canada News Release: “Work on national blood system continues,” February 10, 1997. 
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• The Canadian Blood Agency continued in its role until a new system could assume its 
responsibilities189 
 
 The steps the ministers of health took to create a new blood system were remarkable. 
For the first time in Canada history, the governments were approaching the blood system with 
a significant amount of planning instead of the ad hoc system the Red Cross created. The 
governments were directly involved with the creation of the system, rather than the inheritors 
of it; they consulted with all the affected groups – particularly hemophiliacs and those most 
affected by the tainted blood scandal – as to the most effective way to provide blood and blood 
products; they kept the agencies working on the blood system until such time as they could be 
replaced, instead of rushing into a solution that could have had even worse consequences. The 
federal/provincial/territorial ministers of health were approaching this problem in a more by-
the-book way than any previous changes. 
 Over the course of the summer, the ministers continued their work on the blood system. 
In August, the Red Cross officially withdrew from any part of the new blood system. As its 
President, Janet Davidson, said, “it is in the best interest of all Canadians to allow the new 
agency to keep all the blood program operations integrated.”190 The Red Cross agreed to help 
with a smooth transition to the new blood system and to continue its many other humanitarian 
efforts in Canada.191 For their part, the ministers continued with preparations to build a new 
blood system. 
 
189 Health Canada News Backgrounder: “New Blood System: Planning Update,” February 10, 1997. 
190 Health Canada News Release: “Joint statement by Health Ministers and the Red Cross on plans for the new 
blood system,” August 1, 1997. 
191 Health Canada News Release: “Joint statement by Health Ministers and the Red Cross on plans for the new 
blood system,” August 1, 1997. 
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 In November, 1997, the ministers and the Canadian public received Justice Krever’s 
report and recommendations. The report was three volumes and 1100 pages long. It covered a 
massive amount of material, ranging from a history of the Canadian blood system, to its 
governance flaws, to the technical ways in which blood is used, to the approaches taken by 
other countries in dealing with the AIDS virus in their blood systems. Some of this information 
has been covered elsewhere in this thesis, while other information does not bear directly on the 
subject of blood system governance. The Krever Report is certainly the biggest, most 
comprehensive study of the Canadian blood system, and as such is a most valuable resource. 
 The report made fifty recommendations for the governments. Although all are 
important to the blood system, only some are germane to the issues of intergovernmental 
relations. The rest of the recommendations deal with the specifically scientific nature of the 
blood system and are unimportant to this discussion.  
 Before examining each of the recommendations related to the governments, it is 
important to note that the overall thrust of Justice Krever’s recommendations was to both fix 
the specific problems he discovered and to ensure that such a tragedy could never again occur 
in Canada. All of these governance recommendations focus on the need for any blood authority 
to be independent, focused solely on the blood system, completely national, and operating at 
arm’s length from any government or government agency. 
 Each of the recommendations made in the report speak to a particular deficiency of the 
Red Cross/CBA-run blood system. Had the recommendations been in place during the 1970s 
and 1980s, it is conceivable that the blood tragedy might not have occurred. If nothing else, 
their earlier implementation could have helped create a better blood system.  
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 In any case, the recommendations are listed in Appendix 1. The recommendation 
number Justice Krever used is included, as is a brief rationale and discussion on the use of that 
particular recommendation. In the report, Justice Krever goes into some detail as to the reasons 
for making these particular recommendations; this table has only some of his reasons, as they 
pertain to subjects outside the scope of this thesis. 
 The Krever Report, when released in November 1997, began a firestorm of controversy 
over who was responsible for compensating victims of the tainted blood tragedy. Although this 
was an important debate across the country – and although it will come up in this paper – it is 
incidental to a discussion about Canadian Blood Services specifically because it was a debate 
that occurred outside the governance issues raised by the Krever Inquiry. 
 When federal Minister of Health Allan Rock released the Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Blood System in November 1997, he sought to reassure Canadians that the 
federal government was working to ensure that the blood system was safe and would continue 
to be safe under governmental leadership. He reiterated the federal/provincial/territorial 
governmental commitment to reform the system under four principles: 
• Safety of blood is paramount; 
• A fully-integrated approach is essential; 
• Accountabilities must be clear; 
• The system must be transparent192 
 
 
192 Health Canada News Release: “Federal leadership to reform Canada’s blood system since Justice Krever’s 
interim report,” November 6, 1997. 
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In the news release, Rock emphasized the role of the federal government in providing 
leadership for reforming the blood system. He said that Health Canada “carefully monitors 
developments at all levels in the blood system”193 and that it would take a leadership role in 
ensuring the safety of the blood system. Minister Rock established a Blood Safety Council to 
advise the government on blood safety so that his ministry could continue leading other 
governments in ensuring the safety of the Canadian blood system.194
 Although Rock did not misrepresent any of the facts in his press release, it is clear that 
he wanted the federal government to take credit for any changes resulting from the Krever 
Report. For example, the release opened by saying that “Health Canada played a key role in 
reforming the national blood system, by helping the provinces, territories, consumers and 
technical specialists focus on the need for a better, more effective system.”195 Although the 
provinces and territories had ultimate responsibility for changing the blood system, the federal 
Minister of Health suggested that it was the federal government that was more responsible for 
any success than the provinces and territories. 
 It was certainly proper for the federal government to take a lead role in implementing 
the Krever Report (both the interim and final reports) as the Commission was a federal 
Commission – although both Ontario and Prince Edward Island commissioned Justice Krever 
separately – and thus the reports were issued to the federal government. The federal Minister of 
Health, however, forced the provincial governments to take action when he released the final 
report on November 26, 1997: he emphasized “the government’s commitment to provide 
 
193 Health Canada News Release: “Federal leadership to reform Canada’s blood system since Justice Krever’s 
interim report,” November 6, 1997. 
194 Health Canada News Release: “Federal leadership to reform Canada’s blood system since Justice Krever’s 
interim report,” November 6, 1997. 
195 Health Canada News Release: “Federal leadership to reform Canada’s blood system since Justice Krever’s 
interim report,” November 6, 1997. 
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Canadians with a full response to Justice Krever’s report as soon as possible.”196 Since the 
federal government could not implement all the recommendations by itself (although it could 
implement the regulatory recommendations, as Health Canada is responsible for blood 
regulations), provinces had to be involved with any structural changes to the Canadian blood 
system and its governance. 
The Memorandum of Understanding: a National Blood Authority 
Over the course of 1997-1998, the federal and provincial governments worked together to 
create a new National Blood Authority, based on the discussion they had already had and on 
the recommendations of the Krever Report. The result of their negotiations was Canadian 
Blood Services. The federal, provincial, and territorial governments recorded their 
responsibilities and requirements in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) so that, as 
Justice Krever stated – and as the provinces affirmed in their guiding principles – 
accountabilities could be clear. The MOU set in place a framework both for the new National 
Blood Authority and a mechanism for moving the blood program to it from the Red Cross 
Blood Transfusion Services. 
This mechanism – called the Transition Bureau – was created by the provinces, and had 
a slightly different set-up than the new National Blood Authority (on which more later) 
because of its rather different mandate. In October, 1997, Health Canada announced its 
creation, informing Canadians that it would “manage all aspects of transition and the steps 
required to set up the national blood services.”197 To perform its task, the Transition Bureau 
had eleven members, appointed from three regions of Canada (Atlantic Canada, Ontario, and 
 
196 Health Canada News Release: “Krever Commission report – Federal Government Releases Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada,” November 6, 1997. 
197 Health Canada Information Release, “Bureau to manage smooth transition to the new blood system,” October 
1997. 
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Western Canada), the federal government, and a consumer representative (this last 
representative could come from hospitals or from an organization such as the Hemophilia 
Society; any organized group using blood or blood products was technically eligible). If 
Québec chose to join the Transition Bureau, it would also have received three seats. 
All the regions, then, had an opportunity and a voice in the new system’s creation. The 
three members from each region would not only speak on behalf of that region, but they would 
also have authority and expertise to make that voice heard. The MOU requires that the three 
seats be held by “a Deputy Minister or a designate, a representative from the business 
community and a health care administrator from each area.”198 Three critical components of 
the business/governance framework could then be in place. A representative from government 
allowed each of the provinces to retain direct contact with the Bureau; a business 
representative helped ensure the creation of a good business model; a health care administrator 
could speak to the issues directly affecting the public health system in each province. 
The creation of the Transition Bureau proves that the governments wanted to set up a 
new national blood system in a thoughtful, meaningful way. As we have already established, 
the Red Cross Blood Transfusion Services had no formal structure at first; what structure it did 
have was largely created on an ad hoc basis, usually in response to a specific need or set of 
events. Provinces were not proactive in dealing with blood-related problems, nor did they have 
a formal say in its governance until the Red Cross required money. 
 
198 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding, 1997, p. 33. 
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The Transition Bureau was an attempt by the provinces to do two things. First, it 
assured that the move from the Red Cross to the National Blood Authority could occur in an 
orderly fashion. Second, the negotiations with the Red Cross and the implementation of the 
Memorandum of Understanding occurred under the watchful eye of the governments; the 
blood system, which had grown up independent of governments and with very little oversight 
by them, was directly responsible to the provincial governments for its creation and its 
mandate. 
 In creating the Transition Bureau, the provinces gave it a wide mandate. Other than the 
composition of the first Board of Directors – approved by the federal, provincial, and territorial 
ministers of Health in July, 1997 – the Bureau had wide-ranging authority to complete its task 
by September, 1998. It appointed a negotiator to deal with the Red Cross and managed all 
resources dealing with the transition. Interestingly, though, the Ministers retained authority to 
both determine the negotiator’s mandate and ratify the results of these negotiations.199 This is 
logical, given the responsibility of provincial governments for the blood resources held by the 
Red Cross. Although governments did not undertake negotiations specifically, they remained 
responsible for the outcome of those negotiations. 
What is Quebec’s place? 
From the very beginning of reform efforts, Québec decided it would find its own path and 
make its own determinations as to the future of a Québec blood system. This was clear in 1996, 
when the other health ministers stood together and announced they would work together on 
reform. The Québec Minister of Health “agreed with his colleagues that there are problems in 
the current blood system, specifically the lack of clarity of responsibilities of the various 
 
199 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding, 1997, p. 34. 
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partners.”200 As has become customary, the Québec government took the position that the 
blood system falls under the auspices of the provincial government and thus any solution 
would be made in Québec, for Québec, by Québeckers. The Parti Québecois government 
undertook its own research to “establish mechanisms for operating and organizing the blood 
management system that are integrated within the reorganization of its health care system.”201 
As the provinces announced their own plans, Québec did not rule out the possibility of 
collaboration, but made it very clear that the province would operate its own system.202
How does CBS work? 
Although CBS is a corporation created under the Canada Corporations Act, the document 
setting out a framework for its creation is the MOU signed by the governments in late 1997. 
The agreement is 34 pages long and signed by every Minister of Health in the country (with the 
exception of Québec). As a guiding document, it is the first of its kind in the Canadian blood 
system. For the first time, the NBA could know exactly how governments were involved in 
governing it and how it could be independent of those same governments. A brief review of the 
text of the MOU is certainly in order at this point. 
 The provincial and territorial governments, represented by the ministers responsible for 
the health portfolio in each government, set up an agreement with the federal government 
(through the Ministry of Health), to provide blood services across the country. The MOU itself 
stated that the federal, provincial, and territorial ministers of health wanted a record of their 
“understandings and commitments … regarding their respective roles and responsibilities in a 
renewed national blood system, including their future relationships with the National Blood 
 
200 Health Canada News Release, April 25, 1996. 
201 Health Canada News Release, April 25, 1996. 
202 Health Canada News Release, “New blood system announced,” September 10, 1996. 
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Authority (NBA) and its function and structure.”203 From the very start, the governments 
wanted to set the right tone for a new blood agency. They wanted to show that they learned 
from the mistakes of the past and were stating in the clearest possible language that they would 
provide clear lines of accountability for and sharp oversight of the new system. 
 Section 2.0 of the MOU defined “blood system,” “blood supply system,” and “blood” 
so that there would be no confusion in the future. “Blood supply system” is defined as “all 
activities and functions managed and operated on a national basis by the NBA.”204 These 
functions are described in Annex A of the MOU. Suffice it to say that the governments tasked 
NBA with the recruitment, collection, processing, and distribution of blood and blood 
products. To support these tasks, the provinces required the NBA to provide for standard 
policies and procedures meeting or exceeding federal and provincial guidelines; to create a 
research and development program; to provide for professional and public education; to create 
a risk management system within the Authority.205  
 Not only did the governments provide clear lines of accountability, but they provided a 
specific role for the National Blood Authority instead of allowing it to add a piece here and a 
piece there. In other words, the governments gave the Authority a job to do, unlike the Red 
Cross, which created jobs for itself in addition to its humanitarian causes. 
 The MOU reconfirmed the seven principles of the blood system adopted in 1989,206 and 
added the following four: 
• The safety of the blood supply is paramount; 
• A fully integrated approach is essential; 
 
203 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding, 1997, p. 5. 
204 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding, 1997, p. 6. 
205 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding, Annex A, 1997, p. 20. 
206 See page 65. 
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• Accountabilities must be clear; 
• The renewed blood supply system must be transparent.207 
It is under these principles that the provincial and territorial governments (along with the 
federal) created a new blood system. The governments wanted this to be a brand new system; 
they wanted it so much that clauses 4.7 and 4.8 indemnify the new agency from anything done 
or not done by previous incarnations of the blood authority. The National Blood Authority, 
erected under the MOU, was truly a new blood agency. 
 Sections 5 and 6 of the MOU re-confirm the constitutional responsibilities of the 
federal and provincial governments and cover “motherhood and apple pie” issues, such as the 
responsibility of the federal Minister of Health to regulate the blood industry and the 
responsibility of the provincial governments to ensure that their respective public health 
systems integrate the NBA as efficiently as possible.  
 Section 7 covers financial arrangements for both the transition from the Red Cross to 
the new National Blood Authority and the ways in which the provinces will continue to fund it. 
The Red Cross, Canadian Blood Agency and Canadian Blood Committee, it will be 
remembered, had difficulty dealing with the continual need to change fiscal arrangements. 
Section 7 of the MOU clearly moves to address these issues. The governments defined the 
transition funds specifically so that all parties involved would be aware of upcoming costs. 
More important, however, is Section 7.2.2 of the Memorandum of Understanding, which says 
the provincial and territorial Ministers of Health will provide funding based on the blood and 
blood products that they each use. According to Sophie de Villers, Executive Director for 
Policy and Planning at Canadian Blood Services, the breakdown of funding looks like this: 
 
207 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding, 1997, p. 6. 
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Table 3: CBS Funding by Province 
Province Percentage of CBS funding 
Newfoundland 2.7 
Prince Edward Island 0.5 
Nova Scotia 4 





British Columbia 15 
Nunavut 0.04 
Yukon Territory 0.07 
Northwest Territories 0.006 
 
 Ms. de Villers added that the numbers include “total budget (blood operations, 
fractionated products, patient services and Captive Insurance)…The numbers are very much 
proportionate to the overall population of each province.”208  
 Finally, the MOU addresses the need for the NBA’s Board of Directors to be 
incorporated and able to borrow money; it also addresses specific funding for research and 
development and for the federal government to improve “federal capacity for regulation and 
national disease surveillance in relation to blood and blood products.”209 These all respond 
directly to criticisms of the Red Cross made by Justice Krever’s report. 
                                                 
208 Email from Sophie de Villers, February 25, 2003. 
209 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding, 1997, p. 14. 
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 The Memorandum of Understanding also contains provisions for a review of blood 
operations within five years of the NBA’s creation. In addition, any party to the MOU can 
leave after providing one year’s written notice and after negotiating for the disbursement of 
that party’s assets and liabilities within the NBA. Moreover, the Members of the NBA can 
admit new Members with unanimous consent, leaving the door open for Québec to join at a 
later date. 
 There are also three annexes to the MOU, which are actually the most important parts 
of this discussion. The first Annex (Annex A) defines the functions and responsibilities of the 
National Blood Authority. In short, the NBA is required to do everything involved with 
“ensuring access to a safe, secure and affordable blood supply.”210
The MOU Annex B is divided into five different sections: the features of the new 
system, a description of the new National Blood Authority, the responsibility of provincial 
governments as Members, the responsibilities of Ministers, and the set-up of and initial 
direction for the Board of Directors.  
 Annex B lays out a governance model for the NBA in clear language so that there can 
be no misunderstanding as there was under the Red Cross, CBA, and CBC. Before embarking 
on a discussion of this governance model, it would be helpful to see how exactly how this 
model works for Canadian Blood Services: 
 
210 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding, 1997, p. 20. 
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Figure 3: CBS Governance Structure 
Ministers of Health (as both Ministers and Members)
Board of Directors 
Executive Management Team
Canadian Blood Services Employees
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 Ultimately, the National Blood Authority is responsible to the Canadian people. Its  
employees report to an Executive Management Team, who report to a Board of Directors, who 
are appointed by and responsible to the provincial health ministers as Members of the 
Corporation, who are responsible to their respective legislatures, who are responsible to the 
provincial electorates. 
 The provincial and territorial Ministers of Health, in their role as Members of the 
Corporation, shall “play a role similar to shareholders.”211 As the MOU says, however, this 
role complements that of Minister of Health; the individuals holding the health portfolio would 
then seem to have dual roles within the NBA. Of course, the Memorandum anticipates this 
potential conflict of interest (i.e. that the same person is responsible both for a ministerial 
portfolio and has a role running a business) and defines the roles and responsibilities of 
Ministers as Ministers and then as Members of the Corporation: 
As Ministers212 As Members212
• Responsible for the effectiveness of the 
blood supply within the 
provincial/territorial health care 
systems 
• Funding the NBA as directed by its 
Members 
• Recommending to the federal Minister 
of Health proposed changes in NBA 
legislation 
• Responsible for the mission and 
mandate of the NBA 
• Approving the NBA’s 3-year business 
plan submitted by the Board of 
Directors 
• Selecting the Board of Directors 
• Holding the Board accountable for its 
decisions 
• Retaining the power to remove some or 
all of the Board 
• Making available to the public the 
NBA annual report 
 
This dichotomy between the Ministers’ responsibilities as Members and as 
representatives of their government is an interesting one. After all, it would be easy to ask the 
                                                 
211 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding, 1997, p. 24. 
212 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding, 1997, p. 27-28 
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question, “Although Members are forbidden from interfering with operational decisions, can’t 
they exert influence over the Board they appoint and remove?” This question is even more 
important in the context of the creation of Canadian Blood Services: the Krever Inquiry created 
a climate of fear surrounding the blood system and forced the governments to take a long look 
at their responsibilities to the Canadian public. This is not to say that a “climate of fear” did not 
already exist. In fact, recipients of blood and blood products had reason to fear the blood 
supply, which is what led to the Krever Inquiry. In this case, however, the climate of fear 
moved from the general public into the political sphere. Those most responsible for managing 
the blood system were afraid of another preventable tragedy and were also afraid of making a 
lasting mistake. 
The MOU requires that the Members fund the NBA through “grants and contributions” 
and that governments have “appropriate safeguards to ensure fiscal accountability.” However, 
once they provide this money to the NBA, it “must be able to exercise complete management 
discretion over all operation blood system decisions.”213 It will be remembered that the 
paralysis over some Red Cross management decisions requiring approval by the CBC led to 
the blood tragedy in the 1980s. This is a step to ensuring that this cannot happen again. 
Moreover, the MOU’s next bullet states that “management discretion” includes health 
and safety issues and decision-making capability to ensure the continued safety of the blood 
system. The bullet even defines a decision-making matrix for the NBA: “Decisions in this 
regard will be made within a health risk management framework which places on an equal 
footing the three critical elements of cost, benefit and risk.”214 This provides the NBA with 
some cover in the event of difficulties with the blood system. First, it requires that cost be only 
 
213 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding, 1997, p.25. 
214 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding, 1997, p.25. 
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one part of the decision-making framework. One of the difficulties Justice Krever identified 
was that the Red Cross could not always act when it needed to because of cost issues. Under 
the MOU, cost has to be weighed against the benefits of action as well as the risk of not taking 
action in a given situation. 
The MOU also requires the National Blood Authority to maintain its federal license and 
to “comply with federal regulations, and meet the same health and safety standards that apply 
to all manufacturers of biologic pharmaceuticals.”215 In many ways, this clause is not required 
as it simply repeats what is required under federal law. However, it also provides the Board, 
NBA, and provinces with an obligation to implement whatever the federal government requires 
under the annual Food and Drugs Act inspections. The Red Cross, as noted in an earlier 
chapter, could not always implement the federal decisions because the provinces would not or 
could not act to fund them. The MOU now required them to. 
In addition, the MOU provides the National Blood Authority with a mechanism for 
dealing with emergencies. The Members approve a 3-year plan submitted by the Board of 
Directors, which includes a plan for dealing with emergencies and a budget line to fund NBA 
responses. According to the MOU, the CEO, in consultation with the Scientific Advisory 
Committee, can make use of this fund without consulting with the Ministers beforehand. The 
NBA must report “significant emergency expenditures”216 to the Members, who can then 
approve of the actions taken, audit the NBA, or replace the Board of Directors. The MOU also 
reminds us that Ministers as Ministers have the option to withdraw from the NBA under the 
applicable clauses.217
 
215 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding, 1997, p. 26. 
216 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding, 1997, p. 31. 
217 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding, 1997, p. 31-32. 
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As Ministers, the provincial and territorial ministers of health have a number of 
responsibilities regarding the National Blood Authority. First is their obvious responsibility as 
a Minister of the Crown. They have direct responsibility to the Legislature of their province 
and through them, the people, to ensure that public funds are well spent. There is therefore a 
political interest in ensuring that the blood program is well-run. With a well-run blood system, 
the Ministers could take credit for taking a lead role in resolving one of the biggest health 
problems in the last thirty years. The provincial and territorial ministers of health also have a 
responsibility for providing an appropriate amount of funding and support to the National 
Blood Authority. They are required to ensure that the NBA takes it place as a part of the health 
care system of each province. Without support from the provincial and territorial governments, 
the NBA’s involvement in the Canadian health systems is doomed. 
The Ministers are also responsible as Members of the Corporation. In this role, they are 
each required to temper their provincial political instincts and work together for the good of the 
national blood system. Their specific responsibilities as Members are outlined above, but it is 
interesting to note the dichotomy between their roles as Ministers and their roles as Members. 
As Ministers, the provincial and territorial health ministers have provincial interests and 
accountability to their respective legislatures in mind. As Members, however, they must all 
concentrate on the national outlook and work to ensure that the blood system is national in 
scope. 
As the MOU says, membership in the Corporation is similar to a role of shareholder in 
an incorporated company. As shareholders have a specific interest in ensuring that the 
company in which they have invested runs under sound leadership, so too do the Ministers as 
Members have an interest in ensuring that the National Blood Authority operates efficiently 
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and within the bounds of its obligations to the Canadian people. The Ministers must put aside 
their partisan roles as advocates of a party platform within one province and work with the 
other health ministers for a national good. The Memorandum of Understanding removes the 
ability of the Ministers to pursue provincial needs at the expense of the Canadian blood system. 
Most significantly, forcing the provinces to take a national outlook on their provincial 
roles changes a dynamic inherent to Canadian federalism. In many federal-provincial 
conferences, such as those dealing with the Social Union Framework, health accords, or even 
discussions on funding for municipalities, provincial representatives can return home, saying 
that Ottawa would not give them what the province needs, so they said “no.” Alberta Premier 
Ralph Klein has made a political career of this strategy. Ottawa has no place in the governance 
model of the National Blood Authority. Provinces no longer have a built-in scapegoat and must 
therefore take responsibility for their own actions. This new model then forces provinces to 
look at both the national good and at the provincial good. Although provincial interests define 
the “national good”, the provinces also have a responsibility to at least consider the needs of 
other provinces when acting as shareholders.  
 Under the MOU, the Board of Directors is made up of representatives from each of the 
regions (British Columbia and Yukon; Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and the Northwest 
Territories; Ontario; and New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, 
and Nunavut), consumer representatives, and medical and scientific experts.218 The whole 
point, of course, was to ensure that two of the major problems under the Red Cross were 
solved: first, that the blood system be directed by people who knew a little something about 
 
218 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding, 1997, p. 27-28.The Transition Bureau only 
had one consumer representative, no technical representatives, one federal representative, and three 
representatives from each of the regions. Nunavut was added to the representation from the Atlantic provinces 
after its creation in 1999. 
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blood, blood products, and running a blood system. The Red Cross’s board was made of people 
who ran the entire Red Cross program, not just the blood system; this new initiative would put 
an end to that practice. 
The second problem this approach solved was that the Board has representation from 
the provinces that were directly empowered to run a blood system. Neither the CBA nor the 
CBC could make any decisions affecting the blood system without first seeking the approval of 
the provinces. Under the MOU, the Board had direct authority to run the system within the 
budget parameters set by the provinces. Even then, however, while the provinces as Members 
ultimately approve the overall use of public funds, the Board of Directors has authority to 
approve budget documents for submission to the Members of the Corporation.219  
Even though the Board is technically independent on an operational level, it is still 
accountable to the provincial governments as Members. Additionally, three Board members are 
regional representatives and so can communicate with the provinces they represent. In fact, 
some provinces required them to communicate regularly, so the Board of Directors required 
regional directors to submit regular reports on their contacts with the provinces.220 Two 
different clauses of the Annex speak directly to the authority held by the Ministers over the 
Board, and a third has implications for their independence: 
• Should objectives for the blood program not be met satisfactorily, 
Members will hold the Board accountable to take corrective action. 
 
• Members retain the power to remove some or all of the Board. 
 
• Members shall have the authority to require direct external 
comprehensive management audits and targeted special audits of the 
NBA at their discretion.221 
 
 
219 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding, 1997, p.30.  
220 Minutes of Board of Directors meeting dated May 19, 1999, p. 3. 
221 Federal/Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding, 1997, p. 28. 
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The first clause listed allows the Board to take responsibility for satisfying the 
provinces as to the suitability of a given set of actions. Although the provinces may require 
changes to Board policies, an independent Board is ultimately accountable for making those 
changes. The second clause provides the Ministers with some power in dealing with an 
unsatisfactory Board of Directors; the Members retain final authority over who sits on the 
Board. Although the provincial governments cannot intercede directly on operational 
decisions, it would appear that they can hold a certain amount of influence over those who do. 
Further, the third clause could provide the provinces with a way to ensure they use quantifiable 
data in their decision to remove some or all of the Board; they can ask for a specific audit to 
find something good or bad about the Board’s actions and can then take action based on the 
audit report. There is, however, a corollary to this statement: changes to the Board’s structure 
require agreement from a majority of Members, so decisions affecting only one province 
cannot occur unless the Membership agrees.  
The Memorandum of Understanding provides the provincial governments, National 
Blood Authority, and Canadian public with a certain level of assurance that the blood system 
has a solid base on which to be run. This document marked a major change in the development 
of the Canadian blood system. After all, the Red Cross had taken responsibility for the blood 
supply as a charitable organization and ran it without government support for many years. As 
costs grew, the blood system grew up around ever-changing needs instead of basing decisions 
on a master plan on which everyone agreed. 
This is not to suggest that the MOU anticipates every eventuality or that it is a perfect 
system. Instead, it provides clear accountabilities for actions taken (or not taken) and ensures 
that those who are responsible for governance, funding, and administration of the blood system 
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know who they are and to whom they report. It solves a number of problems inherent under the 
Red Cross system and puts control of the blood system firmly in the hands of the provincial 
governments. The Red Cross’s need for impartiality and independence from governments 
could no longer stand in the way of governmental requirements; the blood system, under the 
MOU, could finally become an integrated part of the public health system, with many of the 
same regulatory requirements, fiscal frameworks, and responsible heads. 
The question at this point is: now that the theoretical model for a National Blood 
Authority has been established, how does it work in practice? 
Canadian Blood Services and the Government(s) 
When Canadian Blood Services was established in September, 1998, it ushered in a new way 
of looking at Canada’s blood system. The blood supply, as a part of the provincial health 
networks (although run on a national level), was fully under the control of the governmental 
apparatus. The federal government retained its responsibility for regulation and approval of 
new initiatives while the provincial and territorial governments exercised total control over the 
new system (although not directly over the operation of it). In other words, the governments 
could all tell themselves and the Canadian people that the blood system was well on its way to 
being fixed. 
 Although this certainly was true to some extent, the Ministers of Health and the new 
Executive Management Team (EMT) had to tread very carefully to avoid the mistakes of the 
past. The Canadian Blood Services website takes great pains to illustrate the differences 
between the Red Cross Blood Transfusion Services and the new, non-profit corporation 
dedicated only to the collection and distribution of blood and blood products. The “Frequently 
Asked Questions” (FAQ) section of the site discusses some of the changes and the 
 
COLLABORATION, COMPETITION, AND COERCION:  PAGE 112 
CANADIAN FEDERALISM AND BLOOD SYSTEM GOVERNANCE 
 
                                                
organizational requirements laid on CBS by the governments. Specifically, the website points 
out that the Ministers of Health may not direct specific operational decisions of CBS, but must 
remain responsible for the use of public funds they authorize.222  
 CBS Annual Reports also point to a new thinking surrounding the way the blood 
system works. Each of the reports is entitled, “A Report to Canadians,” indicating an 
understanding of the corporation’s special relationship with the public. Unlike many 
corporations, Canadian Blood Services is not only accountable to its shareholders, but also to 
the public whose trust it holds. 
 CBS issued its first Annual Report six months after opening its doors. Obviously, its 
first task was to introduce the new corporation to the country and illustrate some of the 
differences between CBS and its predecessor, the Red Cross. Indeed, the new blood agency 
recognized its unique position by stating that its mission includes gaining “the trust, 
commitment and confidence of all Canadians by providing” safe blood and blood products.223 
The report calls additional attention to the goal of regaining the trust of Canadians with a brief 
discussion of the events that led up to the creation of Canadian Blood Services. In its 
introduction to Canadians, CBS notes some of the major changes from the old system to the 
new, including the autonomy of the Board of Directors, openness in operations, and clear lines 
of accountability.224
 Each of the Annual Reports issued over the last six years makes reference to the special 




ument, Canadian Blood Services –FAQ’s Operations 
223 Canadian Blood Services Annual Report, A Report to Canadians: Our first six months 1998/1999 (Ottawa: 
Canadian Blood Services, 1999), p. 1. 
224 A Report to Canadians 1998/1999, p. 3. 
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governments. It is this relationship that makes the corporation work and it is this relationship 
that is the focus of our study. It appears that each of the provincial and territorial governments 
adheres to the terms of operation set out in the Memorandum of Understanding. Given the 
public attention given to the blood system in recent years, it would be irresponsible for the 
Ministers to be seen to violate any portion of the agreement. In fact, inquiries to the provincial 
governments asking specific questions about the policy and funding processes for the purposes 
of this study  met with strikingly similar responses. 
 Each province and territory has a contact within the ministry responsible for health 
whose job it is to deal with Canadian Blood Services. Each contact was asked a number of 
different questions, including: 
1. How is your province or territory’s portion of CBS’s budget determined? 
2. What role does your province have in creating policy for CBS? 
3. How does your province determine its policy agenda with respect to CBS funding and 
governance? 
Although the actual words varied from province to province, the message was the same from 
each of them: the MOU provides direction on each of these issues. Each province and territory 
looks to the MOU as a guide and takes great pains to follow the rules as set out in this 
agreement. To the provinces and territories, Canadian Blood Services truly seems to be an 
arm's-length agency. 
 Additionally, the provinces have appointed one of their number to act as “lead 
province” in dealings with Canadian Blood Services. The lead province is appointed every two 
years, although Ontario was lead province for three years, and British Columbia has been lead 
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province for almost four.225 The provinces co-ordinate their agendas and communicate them to 
CBS through the lead province, and CBS reports to the provinces through this lead. The lead 
province is currently British Columbia. 
 The British Columbia Ministry of Health Services provided further information on the 
responsibilities of the lead province through some email correspondence: 
The PT [provincial/territorial] lead for the blood system is the main liaison 
between the PTs, CBS, and other stakeholders. As such it performs issues 
management functions and works toward PT consensus on all matters involving 
the blood system. This is done through the PT lead’s organising, chairing and 
addressing outcomes of meetings and teleconference calls for which it provides 
secretariat responsibilities. The PT lead also provides representation on behalf 
of PTs on national committees such as the NTWG [National Technical Working 
Group] as well at conferences and workshops.226
 
 It is somewhat strange that, in a system replete with government regulation, there is no 
mention of the lead province or its functions in the MOU. In some ways, though, this is 
appropriate, as the lead province has no special status or governance relationship with CBS. 
Instead, the lead province takes an administrative leadership role by co-ordinating the issues of 
the other provinces. 
 Since the creation of Canadian Blood Services six years ago, there has been virtually no 
evidence to suggest that the same kind of dysfunction that existed under the Red Cross has 
manifested itself in the new blood system. This does not mean to suggest that conflicts do not 
exist; it simply appears to be at a much lower level than under the Red Cross. In fact, some 
conflicts could even be explained away as “growing pains” for the corporation. For example, 
when the provinces and territories received the Canadian Blood Services budget submissions 
 
225 Email from Wendy Trotter, Director, Blood and Laboratory Services Directorate, Ministry of Health Services, 
British Columbia. August 31, 2004. 
226 Email from Wendy Trotter, Director, Blood and Laboratory Services Directorate, Ministry of Health Services, 
British Columbia. May 11, 2004. 
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for the 1999/2000 fiscal year, the Atlantic provinces and Alberta had some concerns from their 
respective Treasury Boards. Until the Treasury Boards approved the changes from the previous 
fiscal year, the budget request was on hold.227
 Another such example occurred in 2000, when British Columbia’s Deputy Minister of 
Finance requested both a Performance Plan and annual report of activities from CBS. The CEO 
of Canadian Blood Services had to “clarify the relationship between CBS and the B.C. 
government as one of the Corporate Members.”228  
 Of more concern is something noted by the Performance Review of Canadian Blood 
Services (see below for more information on the Review). Even though the federal, provincial, 
and territorial governments took great pains to design a new blood system, some of the 
difficulties under the Red Cross remained or took new form. Specifically, communications 
problems seemed to plague the new organization in its first four years. One reason for this is 
that CBS and its members have but one official meeting each year, during the annual Ministers 
of Health meetings, usually held in the fall. Otherwise, communication between the two groups 
is limited to teleconferences, which can lead to a less-than-perfect situation for discussions of 
great importance. The result is what the Performance Review called a strained relationship.229
 Additionally, the review noted instances where “members do not always feel they get 
the information they need to make budget decisions and sometimes there is a lack of 
confidence in the information that is provided. CBS does not always feel they get appropriate 
policy direction.”230 Interestingly, this is one of the difficulties identified under the Red Cross, 
 
227 Minutes of Board of Directors meetings dated May 19, 1999 p.2 and June 16, 1999, p. 5. 
228 Minutes of Board of Directors meeting, June 21, 2000, p. 5. 
229 Canadian Blood Services Performance Review, p. 3. 
230 Canadian Blood Services Performance Review, p. 4. 
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although – at least in this case – the mechanisms for providing direction and expertise are a 
little more clear. 
 The Memorandum of Understanding defines the role the Members are to play in policy 
direction and funding approval for Canadian Blood Services. This, however, is an area in 
which the problems identified by the Performance Review become more evident. Specifically, 
the Members periodically require more information on which to base funding decisions and do 
not get it, while CBS believes that the information requests are not always as precise as they 
need to be. CBS has also maintained that it responds to specific requests for information.231
 In spite of this sometimes strained relationship, the level of involvement by ministers 
and ministerial offices in the provinces and territories is extremely low; the political masters of 
the blood system are, in almost all cases, listening to the experts running the blood system and 
allowing them to do their jobs.232 This appears to be in direct response to the criticism that the 
Red Cross itself did not have enough experts running the blood system and that the provinces 
and territories deferred to the CRCS on too many issues. Although the provincial and territorial 
governments are keeping out of the operations of the blood system, they have appointed a 
Board of Directors representing regional, consumer, and scientific interests. The Board, in turn, 
has appointed experts to run the blood system. 
 Based on the available information, Canadian Blood Services appears to be running 
strictly according to the MOU. Governments do not appear to be interfering with the operation 
of CBS, even when it would benefit citizens in their respective provinces. In fact, Watson Gale, 
the Corporate Secretary, on a visit to Hamilton Centre in early 2004, told a story about CBS’s 
 
231 Canadian Blood Services Performance Review, p. 158.  
232 The conflict noted above could be as a result of CBS staff looking for specific requests in order to provide 
answers for the Members, while the Ministers of Health are not always aware of what their precise needs are. As 
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consolidation of functions in the Atlantic provinces. Although this operational decision 
involved a net loss of jobs in Nova Scotia, he said that the Minister of Health in Nova Scotia 
contributed to the discussion and ultimately approved of CBS’s corporate plan.  
Performance Review 
No study of Canadian Blood Services would be complete without discussing the Performance 
Review undertaken at the behest of the provincial/territorial ministers of health in 2002. In fact, 
the MOU required that a review take place within the first five years of CBS’s mandate in 
order to determine whether the National Blood Authority was operating the way it was 
supposed to. It is important to remember that the Review was primarily a review of CBS 
operations and not a study of the relationship between the Members and CBS or between the 
Members themselves. 
 Overall, the Performance Review is positive, noting that Canadian Blood Services has 
done a great deal, especially restoring the public’s faith in the Canadian blood system. The 
review particularly noted that 81% of poll respondents in a 2002 survey agreed that “the blood 
system in Canada is safer today than it was five years ago.”233
 However, the review notes a number of areas in which both Canadian Blood Services 
itself and the Ministers of Health could improve. The most important of these is to clarify the 
roles and responsibilities of each party to the Memorandum of Understanding. After all, there 
are several ambiguous sections of the MOU, including issues of safety and who is ultimately 
responsible for the blood system in Canada.234 The Review points out that clarification of these 
 
in many occupations, the experts cannot always answer a general question well, but are happy to provide all kinds 
of information in response to a specific inquiry. 
233 Canadian Blood Services Performance Review, p. 2. 
234 The issue of safety is not strictly relevant to this study, but the ambiguity surrounding responsibility for the 
blood system is certainly important. After all the MOU says that the NBA is responsible for operating the blood 
system in one place, while stating that the NBA is simply a tool with which the governments will deliver a 
national blood system in another. 
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kinds of issues is extremely important so that all parties are aware of both process and their 
particular roles. 
 Although the governments had a great deal of work to do in restructuring the blood 
system after the Krever report was issued, the National Blood Authority they created appears to 
be functioning well. In spite of a few “glitches” along the way, the ministers of health appear to 
have an amicable relationship with both Canadian Blood Services and each other in dealing 
with a provincially-created, nationally-run blood system. 
 Canadian Blood Services was a remarkable creation. It came out of a disastrous set of 
circumstances, when confidence in the Canadian blood system was at an all-time low. The 
provinces (and the federal government to a limited degree) were able to answer the criticisms 
laid by the Krever Commission and begin the work to restore confidence among Canadians. 
They worked together to create a well-defined system of governance in which roles and 
responsibilities of each party to the system are defined. We will discuss the successes and 
failures of the Ministers of Health in this endeavour, as well as the place of the blood system in 




It seems certain that, when the Canadian Red Cross Society set out to collect blood for the 
military during the Second World War, it did not intend to become an agent for governments 
and ultimately to have a huge impact on the ways in which transfusion medicine is governed in 
this country. The Red Cross signed up to help, as was its mandate; it signed up to do some 
good and help ease the suffering of those injured in war; it signed up to collect blood. 
 As we have seen, the desire to provide a public service had disastrous consequences for 
the Red Cross, the provincial and territorial governments, the public health system, and for the 
many people infected with HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis C in the 1970s and 1980s. The Canadian 
health system is still dealing with the consequences of this blood tragedy; the Toronto Star 
reported on July 10, 2004 that thousands of hepatitis C victims have yet to receive 
compensation from the various governments.235
 Although governments have not entirely dealt with all the issues surrounding the 
tainted blood scandal, the creation of Canadian Blood Services was motivated by the desire to 
address a number of the deficiencies identified by the Krever Report. Even though Justice 
Krever himself wrote that no blood system could ever be truly safe – “safety” being the 
absence of risk – the new blood agency was set up to make it as safe as possible. Stakeholders, 
governments, transfusion medicine experts, and the Krever report itself all contributed to the 
creation of an entirely new system. Said system took the lessons of the past and applied them 
to the present and to future considerations to avoid the failures apparent in the Canadian blood 
system. 
                                                 
235 Rob Ferguson, “Hepatitis C help pledged,” Toronto Star, July 10, 2004. 
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 The Red Cross first collected blood as a charitable organization and as part of its 
mandate to ease human suffering in war. When peace came back to the world, the Red Cross 
continued to collect blood from civilians because it both identified a need and had an 
infrastructure in place to meet that need. As the need for blood grew, so too did the costs 
associated with it; the Red Cross turned to the provincial governments, as providers of health 
care in Canada, for help. As we have already noted, this was the first step in the violation of 
some Red Cross principles, including the principle of independence from government. 
 When the provincial governments started spending public money on the blood system, 
they also started playing a role in determining how that money was spent. Unfortunately, the 
system built itself up piecemeal, requiring more provincial involvement as the Red Cross spent 
more money. As a result, the system changed on a regular basis, adding committees, provincial 
oversight, and muddying the waters of accountability. Furthermore, the Red Cross had greater 
responsibility for the blood system than for most of its other programs; the Board of 
Governors, however, had to provide expertise for all the Red Cross’s divisions. 
 By the time of the tainted blood scandal, there were so many different groups of people 
involved in the blood system that it was hard to know who was really in charge. The Red Cross 
bears partial responsibility for this, but the governments have a much greater culpability; they 
did not set in place appropriate mechanisms for the governance and funding of Canada’s blood 
supply and relied too much on a private organization for managing the blood system. What 
mechanisms were in place – the Canadian Blood Committee and the Canadian Blood Agency – 
were ineffective in providing policy direction to the Red Cross and unable to act without 
information and orders from their respective provincial governments. 
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 The provinces and territories did not live up to their responsibility to provide adequate 
health care when it came to the blood system. They and their representatives did not fully 
understand how to manage the Red Cross’s blood program, nor did the representatives have 
equal power at the boardroom table. The relationships between governments and between 
governments, representatives, and Red Cross were completely dysfunctional; no one was in 
charge during the 1970s and 1980s. 
 The Krever Commission, formed by the federal government to examine a provincial 
creation, issued a scathing report that condemned the players in the blood system for not living 
up to the public trust they held. The report made a number of specific recommendations which 
led to intergovernmental negotiations to create a brand new organization to take over 
management of Canada’s blood supply, Canadian Blood Services. 
 The federal, provincial, and territorial ministers of health set out to create a system that 
would address the recommendations of the Krever Commission, meet the needs of Canadians 
who expect blood to be available when needed, and be adaptive to unknown future needs and 
demands on the blood system. To do so required a significant amount of thought on the part of 
all these ministers, but they succeeded in designing a brand new system. 
 Unlike the blood system under the Red Cross, the governmental oversight of this arms-
length agency was present from the very start. The governments ensured that they drew lines of 
accountability that made the Ministers responsible for their respective health care systems 
while also responsible as shareholders of the blood system. The provinces also appointed a 
Board of Directors who took responsibility for overseeing the actual operation of the system 
after obtaining funding and general policy direction from the provinces. 
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 Over its almost-six-year history, CBS has taken over operations from the Red Cross, 
regained the trust of most Canadians, and has taken strides to increase blood donations from 
year to year. A lot of this success has to do with the improvements made to the system by the 
provincial governments when they signed the Memorandum of Understanding in 1997. 
 Although Canadian Blood Services has been a qualified success, the question of how 
successful the provincial governments have been in overseeing it at arm’s length is more 
important to this discussion. There is certainly no publicly available evidence to suggest that 
the provincial and territorial governments have advanced their own interests at the expense of 
the blood supply. Indeed, as we have seen, Canadian Blood Services has received a great deal 
of co-operation from the governments, even when their actions might result in negative 
consequences to CBS employees in a given province. 
 There have been some clear successes in the change of governance structure. One 
obvious example is the financing arrangements for the blood agency. Under the Red Cross, 
money provided for one province’s blood centre could not be used in another province. The so-
called “national” system was only national because the Red Cross provided services in every 
province. Canadian Blood Services, on the other hand, is a truly national organization. 
Governments provide funding based on an entire organization’s budget, not on the provincial 
government’s willingness to contribute. Additionally, the national nature of the system allows 
CBS to undertake efforts to consolidate functions and provide a more cost-effective 
organization. In other words, the blood supply is now truly national. 
 Accountabilities within the system are also clearer, although there is still some 
ambiguity in interpreting the MOU. While the National Blood Authority is putatively 
responsible for the operation of the blood system in one section, other clauses state that the 
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provinces and territories are to use the NBA as a tool for maintaining the blood supply. It is 
clear that this issue must be addressed to ensure that lines of accountability are as clear as 
possible. 
 Some problems will never disappear without major changes to the division of 
responsibilities in Canadian federalism. The federal government remains responsible for 
regulating the blood industry while the provinces must fund it. The federal Ministry of Health, 
then, has no financial stake in the way it recommends changes to operations; it looks out 
specifically for safety issues and compliance with GMP regulations. While this is certainly 
good from a safety standpoint (recommendations are made based on safety, not on potential 
cost to the provincial/territorial governments), it does require the provinces to fund solutions to 
deviations from regulations over which they have no say. 
 The provincial and territorial Ministers of Health, acting as Members of the 
Corporation, appear to operate as a group and not as individual ministers. Although they do 
obtain funding from their respective Treasury Boards as Ministers of Health, said funding is 
based in large part on blood product usage within that province. There is very little room for 
Ministers to act in the best interests of only their province when working as Members of the 
Corporation. In other words, the Ministers so far have acted collaboratively to provide policy 
direction for Canadian Blood Services instead of competing with one another for the best 
possible provincial deal. 
 That being said, there are a number of records not available even through Freedom of 
Information requests as they fall under the category of “intergovernmental negotiations” or are 
part of confidential records. The absence of the same kind of dysfunction as occurred under the 
Red Cross cannot be construed as proof of a successful organization. Canadian Blood Services 
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is only a few years old, and the players are all still acutely aware of the issues that led to the 
creation of a new blood agency. As long as there are those who remember the tainted blood 
scandal of the 1980s, and as long as stakeholder representatives sit on the Board of Directors of 
Canadian Blood Services, it will be very difficult for political interests to take over the direct 
operation of CBS. 
It is impossible to be sure that the future will not bring a new scandal to the Canadian 
blood supply. As the organization and its relationship with the provincial governments mature, 
the evolving nature of the blood system will undoubtedly bring changes in the ways that 
governments deal with one another and the blood system. If, for example, a recession similar to 
that of the 1990s occurs again, governments may again find themselves strapped for revenues, 
which might aggravate the difficulty of sustaining the health care systems. Such an eventuality 
could mean problems for the funding and governance relationship between 
provincial/territorial governments and the blood agency. 
These issues, however, are hypothetical. The question of where the governance of 
Canadian Blood Services fits in the story of Canadian federalism has not yet been fully 
answered. In creating the new blood agency, there was certainly disagreement on the best 
methods to address the needs of the Canadian Blood system. Québec, for example, believed 
that the individual provinces were best suited to integrating the blood supply into the provincial 
public health system. The other provinces, however (along with the federal government), 
presented a united front to Canadians. It is clear that the provincial governments had to co-
operate in order to create the new blood agency, but one wonders how amicable the closed-
door negotiations really were. However, the evidence points to a fair distribution of costs and 
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representation for the provinces on the Transition Bureau and Board of Directors. Whatever 
competition occurred behind closed doors resulted in a prima facie fair settlement. 
Canada’s blood system occupies a unique place within the history of the Canadian 
federation. It is an exclusively provincial system that must operate on a national level. No other 
provincial program has the same requirement. The public health care system, although 
governed by the federal Canada Health Act, is still provincial in nature. The federal 
government can impose national standards because it provides the financial resources 
necessary for the provinces to conform to those standards (just as the Trans-Canada highway, 
ostensibly a national highway, exists because of the co-ordinating efforts of the federal 
government with provincial public works).  
Federalism in Canada changed regularly, usually in response to external events. It was 
not a planned process, but instead was a reinvention, moulded by circumstance and need. Each 
of Canada’s various phases of federalism affected the relationships between the provincial and 
federal governments; the competition, collaboration, or communication between governments 
had its roots in an adversarial mentality found in the tension between governments within the 
federal model.  
Canadian Blood Services is the exception to this rule. Traditional models of federalism 
do not work in this because the federal government is not a direct part of the CBS governance 
equation. While Ottawa does play a role in regulating the blood industry, it has no direct role in 
policy or funding; the provinces must act together to ensure the stability of the blood system 
and the blood supply in Canada. Ottawa’s role is limited to the regulatory requirements for 
blood and blood products. The federal government could certainly require – for example – that 
the blood system enact more stringent safety precautions, but could not tell the provinces how 
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to change their funding formulae or how to implement the changes. If Canadian Blood Services 
is to succeed, the provincial governments need to work together. Canadian Blood Services 
requires funds and general direction from the provincial governments; as long as they remain 
shareholders, the provinces have a responsibility, as defined by the Memorandum of 
Understanding, to co-operate with one another. The provinces, in turn, have little choice but to 
ensure its success; after all, the tainted blood scandal ensured that the goal of a safe blood 
supply remains in the collective consciousness of the Canadian public. Moreover, the 
provinces have a constitutional responsibility to ensure the provision of health care within their 
borders. As long as there is a public health system, the provincial governments have a duty to 
ensure that the hospitals are adequately supplied with the materials they need to function. 
Finally, the national nature of the blood program as created by the Red Cross meant that the 
infrastructure for a national system was already in place. It was certainly simpler to take over 
existing programs and structures from the CRCS than it would have been to design and 
implement new ones. When Canadian Blood Services took over the blood system from the Red 
Cross, the staff, office buildings, and physical plants did not change; the Executive 
Management Team, Board of Directors, and governance system did. It made logical sense for 
the provinces to take over a working system; it should be remembered that the Krever Report’s 
greatest criticisms were about the relationship between the governments, the CBA, and the Red 
Cross and about the regulatory framework for the blood system, not about the employees and 
facilities actually performing the work. The provinces, then, had to take over systems within 
their borders that interacted on a national level with systems in other provinces. This was a 
final compelling reason to work together.  
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It certainly seems clear that the collaborative federalism ushered in with the 1990s 
played a great part in the creation of Canadian Blood Services. As we have seen, collaborative 
federalism was essential in creating national programs like the Trans-Canada highway. The 
federal government was also instrumental in both solving the tainted blood crisis and in 
creating the new blood agency. Ottawa’s move to lead and co-ordinate provincial efforts is 
certainly in keeping with the traditional definition of collaborative federalism. However, in 
commissioning Justice Horace Krever, the federal government set in motion a series of events 
that helped create a new blood system and — potentially — open the door for a new mode of 
federalism.  
Ottawa’s decision to both commission and release the Krever Report forced the 
provinces to take action. The public outcry after the discovery of the blood system’s failure 
compelled the provinces to make radical changes in the way they governed the Red Cross’s 
Blood Transfusion Services. In making those changes, the provincial governments responded 
to pressure both from their citizens and lobby groups such as the Canadian Hemophilia 
Society. The decision by the provinces to meet and discuss changes to the blood system was a 
reaction to external events: the tainted blood tragedy, the release of the Krever Report, and the 
subsequent public reaction to the deficiencies of the Red Cross. 
Although the federal government could not act unilaterally to make changes to the 
governance of the blood system, it could force the provinces to act by manoeuvring them into a 
situation where they had no choice but to react. This could even be a new stage in federalism: 
“coercive federalism,” although some scholars could argue that Ottawa acted in a similar 
fashion during the Second World War and in the post-war era. By forcing the provinces to act, 
Ottawa was able to position itself as being part of the solution to the problem – the federal 
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Minister of Health was, after all, the one who announced the changes to the blood system as 
they occurred – without actually having to solve the problems.  
In this set of events, the provinces and federal government acted as crisis managers. 
They reacted to an event unprecedented in Canadian history and tried to ensure a lasting 
solution. The nature of federalism could very well be starting to shift, because of the co-
operative and coercive elements involved in creating the new blood agency. The evidence, 
however, is not yet clear on this point: Canadian Blood Services is a unique case; safe blood is 
something Canadians expect to have on demand, and the visceral reaction to the tainted blood 
scandal required an equally strong response.  
Even if federalism is starting to shift again, there is not yet enough evidence available 
to make that conclusion. The response to the blood crisis in the 1990s has thus far been unique 
in Canadian federalism; other policy areas have not shown the same tendency to collaboration 
and coercion as the blood file. 
The provinces have thus far managed to work together to fund and govern Canadian 
Blood Services. In spite of being coerced into action by external events and the federal 
government, the provincial governments have been able to deal with the ongoing issues within 
the blood agency. Coercive federalism worked in this instance; the provinces had to act 
together or face potential political repercussions. If and when the nature of federalism changes 
again, for whatever reason, the amicable relationship formed by their roles as shareholders in 
the blood system may be dissolved and the Ministers may find themselves co-operating less or 
pushing a provincial agenda at the boardroom table. Of course, this can only occur if the 
benefits of promoting provincial interests outweigh the political costs associated with using the 
blood system as a provincial platform. Québec, for example, succeeded in making the blood 
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system an exclusive provincial matter. Although Héma-Québec co-operates with Canadian 
Blood Services, it is a creature of Québec politics. 
Although we cannot be certain that governments are always co-operating to run the 
system, the evidence is undeniable: the system is working far better than it used to and exactly 
as it was designed to. The themes of competition and collaboration work together (along with            
coercion) to ensure that governments continue to responsibly operate the blood system. The 
federal government forced them to take action on the blood system (although Ontario did react 
earlier than Ottawa on the compensation of victims of the tainted blood scandal, and several 
provinces followed Ontario’s lead in providing more generous compensation than the federal 
government); as competitors, the provinces each wanted credit for helping solve the problems 
plaguing the blood system; as a part of the solution, the provinces worked together both for 
political credit and for the good of Canadians. For the first time in a very long time, 
governments are getting along with one another and with the blood system. 
Each of the governments had a role to play in resolving the issues made public by the 
Krever Report. The provincial governments are continuing to play their roles as defined by the 
Memorandum of Understanding and do not allow political factors to interfere with good 
business decisions. This is somewhat ironic, as political factors appear to have been of 
importance in operating the blood system in the pre-Krever world, and even in forcing 
governments together to determine a solution. 
The blood system is one of the most critical components of the public health system. 
Without readily available blood, surgeries would not happen, research could not occur, and 
hospitals could not do their jobs. If the national blood system does not work the way it is 
supposed to, provincial health networks can easily fail. The provincial governments must co-
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operate in order to make this happen, and in the brief history of Canadian Blood Services, they 
have done just that. As Canadian Blood Services staff often say, the governments are working 
to “build a better blood system for Canadians.” 
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Appendix 1: Selected Krever Recommendations 
 RECOMMENDATION236 RATIONALE 
2 It is recommended that the Canadian blood supply 
system be governed by five basic principles: 
a) Blood is a public resource. 
b) Donors of blood and plasma should not 
be paid for their donations, except in rare 
circumstances. 
c) Whole blood, plasma, and platelets must 
be collected in sufficient quantities in 
Canada to meet domestic needs for blood 
components and blood products. 
d) Canadians should have free and universal 
access to blood components and blood 
products. 
e) Safety of the blood supply system is 
paramount. 
These recommendations are similar to those 
produced by previous meetings of Ministers of 
Health. It reaffirms the public, voluntary nature of 
the blood system as well as reinforcing the notion 
that blood, once given, is something that should be 
available to everyone. 
 
An interesting change from previous sets of 
principles is in recommendation 2 e). Specifically, 
it says that the competing factors of risk and cost 
should play no part in compromising safety. In 
making this recommendation and providing this 
rationale, Justice Krever responded to the 
difficulties at the Red Cross, which required full 
knowledge of a hazard before taking action and 
required a debate over costs. The rationale for 2 e) 
says that ensuring the blood system is safe may 
require substantial sums of money and must be 
governed by already-existing public health 
policies.237
3 It is recommended that Canada have a national 
system for the collection and delivery of blood 
components and blood products. 
The Red Cross’s so-called national system had a 
number of flaws associated with it. First, the 
provincial nature of its funding meant that, except 
in emergencies, blood had to stay within the 
borders of the province. Additionally, provincial 
money could only be spent on blood centres within 
the province providing the money. If the centre in 
Winnipeg required facility upgrades, only 
Manitoba money could be used, even if Ontario 
had a surplus. 
 
Justice Krever argues that a national blood system 
is better suited to dealing with the national health 
problems associated with blood donation and 
distribution.238  
4 It is recommended that the core functions of the 
national blood supply system be performed by a 
single operator and not be contracted out to others. 
In the mid-1990s, the Red Cross mused publicly 
that it might withdraw from the blood system. 
Governments responded positively and talked 
about asking the Red Cross to operate the blood 
donor recruitment portion of the blood system. 
This recommendation speaks directly to that 
possibility. The efficiencies inherent in dealing 
with only one operator instead of several make this 
recommendation somewhat self-explanatory. 
6 It is recommended that the blood supply system be 
operated in an open and accessible manner. 
This is the cornerstone of almost any government-
associated organization. In any organization that 
spends public funds, it is incumbent upon it to 
                                                 
236 Krever, p. 1046-1073. While the wording of the recommendations is lifted verbatim from Krever’s report, the 
rationale is often paraphrased. 
237 Krever, p. 1048-1049. 
238 Krever, p. 1049-1050. 
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 RECOMMENDATION236 RATIONALE 
ensure that it is open to public scrutiny. 
 
By the end of the Krever Inquiry, Canadians had 
very little faith in the blood system. Justice Krever 
recommended that any new system be operated as 
openly as possible in order to reassure Canadians 
that the blood system changed and improved over 
the Red Cross.239
7 It is recommended that the operator of the blood 
supply system be independent and able to make 
decisions solely in the best interests of the system. 
Under the Red Cross, authority was ill-defined and 
often murky. While the Red Cross operated the 
system, the mechanisms by which major decisions 
were made were poorly laid out. The Red Cross 
could try to make a decision in response to a 
growing threat or based on a business need, but the 
Canadian Blood Committee, Canadian Blood 
Agency, or one of the governments could easily 
overrule it for political considerations. Justice 
Krever recommended that the operator be able to 
make decisions independently, although the 
decision-making authority would ultimately be 
vested in the governments funding the blood 
supply. 
8 It is recommended that the authority for the 
operation of the blood supply system be clearly 
defined. 
Recommendation 8 is similar to recommendation 
7. There is nothing more to add except to say that 
this recommendation responded to the problems of 
the Red Cross days when no one really knew who 
was responsible for carrying out what function 
within the blood system. 
10 It is recommended that the blood supply system be 
publicly administered by a national blood service, 
a corporation to be created by an Act of 
Parliament. 
This recommendation stems from the difficulties 
inherent in the Red Cross’s multi-faceted role in a 
provincially-administered system. Justice Krever 
believed that the blood system should be 
integrated into the public health system, not on the 
fringes, as the Red Cross frequently was. He 
further believed that it should be truly national in 
nature, not a national system operated by the 
provinces.240
11 It is recommended that the provincial and 
territorial ministers of health be the members of 
the corporation. 
Since the provinces have constitutional 
responsibility for health care, and since the blood 
system is part of Canada’s health system, it seems 
only natural that the provincial and territorial 
ministers of health play an important role in any 
blood service provider. 
12 It is recommended that the members of the 
corporation appoint an independent board of 
directors to supervise the management of the 
service and that the members of the board carry 
out their duties at arm’s length from government. 
Although the ministers of health have ultimate 
authority for provision of blood services as a part 
of the public health system, they should not be 
directly involved with the operations of the blood 
supply. They can retain their democratic 
legitimacy by appointing a board of directors, but 
can help to ensure that the corporation is not 
politically charged by ensuring the board is 
                                                                                                                                                          
239 Krever, p. 1051. 
240 Krever, p. 1053. 
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 RECOMMENDATION236 RATIONALE 
independent of government. 
15 It is recommended that the national blood service 
be funded by payments from hospitals for the 
blood components and blood products supplied to 
them by the blood service. 
In some ways, this recommendation makes the 
most intuitive sense, and makes one wonder why it 
was not implemented earlier as a part of the Red 
Cross systems. After all, blood is collected for two 
purposes: research and for use by hospitals. If 
hospitals paid for what they required, it could 
make the system that much more efficient. As 
Justice Krever notes, it can also ensure that the 
blood provider can remain in charge of its own 
budget by charging for the products and services it 
provides and funding itself from the revenues thus 
generated.241
16 It is recommended that the provinces and 
territories, no longer bound to finance the blood 
supply system by making grants to the Canadian 
Blood Agency, increase the budgets of hospitals 
using blood components and blood products by 
amounts that will enable them to pay the national 
blood service for these components and products 
without affecting their other programs and 
services. 
This recommendation is the corollary to 
recommendation 15; if the national blood provider 
charges for its services, its customers need the 
ability to pay for them. Accordingly, provincial 
hospitals require extra funding to pay for the extra 
services.  
18 It is recommended that the operation of the 
national blood service be managed by both 
administrative and medical personnel. 
Recommendation 18 makes a great deal of 
intuitive sense. After all, a public health company 
requires medical personnel with the expertise to 
ensure safety, potency, purity, and efficacy of its 
products and services. Additionally, it requires 
administrative experts to see that the corporation is 
run in as efficient a manner as possible. Just as 
non-medical experts cannot attest to the scientific 
issues attendant to providing blood services, non-
administrative experts are not necessarily the best 
people to actually run the programs required by the 
scientific experts. 
Put another way, Justice Krever wanted to ensure 
that the system was run by the best people in the 
fields important to running a blood system 
operation. 
                                                 
241 Krever, p. 1056. 
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